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In the last several decades, animal agriculture has 
experienced a dramatic shift in production methods, from family 
farms to concentrated industrial operations, with societal 
consequences comparable to the Industrial Revolution of the 
nineteenth century.  The new confinement operations raise 
significant moral questions regarding the humane treatment of 
animals subject to modern methods that emphasize economics 
over animal welfare.  The success of the animal welfare 
movement, however, hinges on whether society will adopt 
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regulations, based on moral considerations, that are directly 
opposed to its economic self-interest.  The situation is remarkably 
similar to the plight of child laborers caught in the 
transformation of manufacturing methods during the Industrial 
Revolution.  This article uses the history of child labor reform to 
construct a model for how society enacts protections for 
politically powerless groups, such as children and animals.  
Using the insights of new social movement theory, the article 
concludes that animal welfare reform will require a complex 
mixture of resources, including the difficult task of norm 
development.  While the path to such reform is long, the child 
labor history shows that success is possible. 
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How does a man rest at night knowing that in this strawless 
dungeon of pens are all of these living creatures under his care, 
never leaving except to die, hardly able to turn or lie down, 
horror-stricken by every opening of the door, biting and fighting 
and going mad? 
Matthew Scully, Dominion 2002 
 
Children of all ages, down to three and four, were found in the 
hardest and most painful labor, while babes of six were 
commonly found in large numbers in many factories.  Labor from 
twelve to thirteen and often sixteen hours a day was the rule.  
Children had not a moment free, save to snatch a hasty meal or 
sleep as best they could.  From earliest youth they worked to a 
point of extreme exhaustion, without open-air exercise, or any 
enjoyment whatever, but grew up, if they survived at all, weak, 
bloodless, miserable, and in many cases deformed cripples, and 
victims of almost every disease.  
William F. Willoughby, Child Labor 1890 
 
Introduction 
The animal welfare movement paints a chilling picture of 
helpless creatures caught in the machinery of agriculture’s 
industrialization, victims of a relentless economic revolution that 
results in deteriorating confinement conditions in pursuit of the 
cheapest production costs.  Corporate owners defend against cries for 
government control by invoking free market principles and stoking 
fears of economic disaster due to foreign competition.  The animals 
themselves, of course, have no voice in the political system that will 
decide their fate; instead, their case must be made by proxy, through 
reformers typically motivated by ideology rather than economic self-
interest. 
 We have been down this road before.  As the above excerpts 
starkly remind us, the last wave of industrialization resulted in the 
increasing abuse of another powerless group – children.  In nineteenth 
century Britain, many thousands of pre-teen children worked at hard 
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labor in factories, mills, and coal mines.1  Even younger children were 
not spared: in 1851, census figures showed that 49,000 British children 
between the ages of 5 and 9 were employed.  As historian E.P. 
Thompson put it, “the exploitation of little children [during the 
Industrial Revolution] was one of the most shameful events of our 
history.”2  Reform came slowly, proceeding incrementally over three-
quarters of a century.  In the end, however, child labor in the 
industrialized world has been largely eradicated, although it remains 
an intractable problem in lesser developed countries.3 
 The abuse of child laborers during the Industrial Revolution is 
strikingly similar to the animal welfare concerns arising from what may 
be called the "Industrialized Agricultural Revolution," a term I use to 
refer to the increasing dominance of concentrated, corporate agriculture 
in the late twentieth century.4  Like children in the 1800s, animals 
                                                 
 1  Because Britain was the first industrialized country to go through the 
cycle of exploitation and reform, this paper will focus on British labor history.  
However, it should be noted that the United States experienced similar child labor 
abuses and a similar progression of reform, although legislative efforts occurred in the 
first instance primarily at the state rather than federal level, which complicates the 
inquiry.  See infra notes 212-18. 
 2   E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 384 
(Penguin 1968) (1963).  Peter Kirby suggests that earlier historians such as Thompson 
were excessively “pessimistic” about child labor.  Modern historians, according to 
Kirby, believe that “the very coherence of family life often depended on the economic 
contributions of children.”  PETER KIRBY, CHILD LABOUR IN BRITAIN, 1750-1890 2-3 
(2003).  Yet, his statistics show that thousands of children were employed in extremely 
demanding jobs, for long hours, at low pay.  The fact that a family’s finances required 
their labor does not make this picture any prettier or less shameful.   
 3  Some modern economists argue that at least some child labor is on 
balance beneficial and that the alternatives to working may be worse for many.  See, 
e.g., S. L. Bachman, A New Economics of Child Labor: Searching for Answers Behind the 
Headlines, 53 J. OF INT’L AFF. 545 (2000).  This article does not attempt to resolve that 
debate. 
 4  See Jodi Soyars Windham, Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is: 
Perverse Food Subsidies, Social Responsibility & the 2007 Farm Bill, 31 ENVIRONS 1, 9-10 
(Fall 2007) (describing dominance of industrialized agriculture); Neil D. Hamilton, The 
Way Ahead: Reaping What We Have Sown: Public Policy Consequences of Agricultural 
Industrialization and the Legal Implications of a Changing Production System, 45 DRAKE L. 
REV. 289, 292 (1997); Darian M. Ibrahim, A Return to Descartes:  Property, Profit, and the 
Corporate Ownership of Animals, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93-97 (2007) (describing 
vertical and horizontal integration in agriculture).  The more general term 
“agricultural revolution” has been used in a variety of contexts, to refer to the 
Neolithic agrarian revolution and the British agricultural revolution of the 18th and 
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caught in the agricultural revolution have been subjected to worsening 
conditions due to the economic pressures of industrial concentration.  
Moreover, animals are powerless, in the sense of having no real choice 
in whether to accept the conditions of their confinement, just as 
children were unable to reject the conditions of their employment.  
Neither group can seek reform directly, because they have no direct 
access to the political system.  Neither group is able to effectively 
organize and protest the conditions of their confinement/employment.  
And both groups have been the beneficiaries of a reform movement 
based largely on moral concerns.  
 Studying the history of child labor reform, therefore, allows us to 
develop a working model of how powerless groups obtain protection in 
our society, which should inform current efforts to protect animals 
from the abuses of increasingly industrialized agriculture.  Remarkably, 
legal scholars traditionally pay little attention to the process of how law 
is made, or how reform may be achieved, preferring instead to examine 
the effectiveness of laws after they are enacted.5  In the animal welfare 
context, there are numerous articles detailing what reforms should be 
enacted, 6 but virtually nothing regarding how those reforms may be 
accomplished.  Yet, many lawyers are engaged in the precisely this type 
of social reform work and require better tools to accomplish the task 
more effectively.  This article begins the process of understanding how 
social reform may be effected in the area of animal welfare.    
 The model presented here may in fact challenge those theories of 
political economy that suggest that the powerless do not obtain rights 
                                                                                                                                
19th centuries, among others.  See generally PETER BELLWOOD, FIRST FARMERS: THE 
ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURAL SOCIETIES (2005); MARK OVERTON, AGRICULTURAL 
REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AGRARIAN ECONOMY 1500-
1850 (1996). 
 5  Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and 
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-84 (2001) (“Social scientists do not involve 
themselves in the technical, seemingly arcane details of legal doctrine, legislative 
drafting, or administrative rulemaking.  And legal scholars do not venture into the 
chaotic, empirical world of mobilization, recruitment, political strategy, and 
organizational behavior.”). 
 6  See, e.g., Amy Mosel, Comment, What About Wilbur? Proposing a Federal 
Statute to Provide Minimum Humane Living Conditions for Farm Animals Raised for Food 
Production, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 133, 138-144 (2001) (describing failure of current law 
to protect animals in agriculture and proposing reform); Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl 
Leahy, Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and Trade, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 
343-58  (2007). 
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or protection unless it becomes expedient for those in power.7  Some 
theorists posit, for example, that civil rights for minorities were enacted 
only when dominant business interests desired a greater labor force or 
when increasing civil unrest threatened economic stability and 
decreased a nation’s stature with trading partners.8  Moreover, 
minority groups were not truly powerless; they did have the ability to 
organize, demonstrate, strike, and (eventually) vote.  If this model is 
correct, the prospect for animal welfare reform, based solely on moral 
concerns, seems unlikely, if not impossible.  Yet, these political 
economy theories cannot explain how powerless groups sometimes do 
obtain legal protection, even when reform runs counter to the economic 
interests of those in power.   
 This paper defines “powerless” to mean those who are without a 
voice in, or ability to influence, the political process except by proxy 
(that is, someone who will act on their behalf for altruistic reasons).  
Slaves do not precisely fit this definition, although they come close.  
While slaves did not have a direct voice in the political system, they did 
have the ability to speak, escape, organize and rebel, which may have 
influenced the path of reform.  Endangered species, or wildlife in 
general, fit the definition of powerless, because they depend for their 
protection entirely on those willing to act on their behalf and have, 
literally, no voice in the political process.   Domestic livestock meet this 
definition as well; they are below the rank of slaves in terms of their 
ability even to influence the conditions of their confinement.  Children 
also can be defined as powerless; they have no vote or financial 
resources to influence politicians and lack the skills necessary to 
organize to pressure those in power for political change.     
 Nevertheless, despite their lack of power, each of these groups -- 
except for domestic livestock -- has eventually obtained significant legal 
protection.  Through an abolition campaign arising out of moral 
indignation, slavery has been outlawed (although not eradicated) in all 
modern civilized societies, despite its apparent economic benefits to 
those in power.9  At great cost to economic interests, most democratic 
                                                 
 7   See infra, Section I. 
 8   Anton D. Lowenberg, Why South Africa’s Apartheid Economy Failed, 15 
CONTEMPORARY ECON. POLICY 62 (1997). 
 9  ADAM HOCHSCHILD, BURY THE CHAINS: PROPHETS AND REBELS IN THE 
FIGHT TO FREE AN EMPIRE’S SLAVES 5 (2005) (describing abolitionist movement as “the 
first time a large number of people became outraged, and stayed outraged for many 
years, over someone else’s rights”) (emphasis in original).  Slavery in a wide variety of 
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societies have enacted significant, stringent legislation to protect 
endangered wildlife from extinction and have entered into 
international treaties for the same purpose.10  Most countries have also 
enacted legislation to protect children from abuse in the home and at 
work, although child labor remains an enormous problem in many less-
developed countries.11    
The process through which the powerless gain legal protection 
follows a remarkably consistent path, exemplified by the story of child 
labor reform.  In the industrial revolution, British children were swept 
into the labor pool and subjected to horrifying work conditions as 
competitive forces pushed factories to test the limits of human 
endurance.  Despite the powerless position of these child laborers, the 
British Parliament gradually responded with regulations designed to 
alleviate these conditions.  The history of child labor regulation 
provides striking parallels to the industrialization of agriculture and 
the resulting deterioration of animal welfare.  If we can use that history 
to develop a model of how powerless groups gain protection, it may 
help us predict and influence the course of animal welfare regulation 
and other environmental protections. 
This article will examine the history of child labor regulation in 
Britain in order to develop a model of political economy that explains 
how powerless groups obtain legislative protection.  Throughout the 
analysis, I will compare the trajectory of child labor reform with events 
in the animal welfare context12 to determine the accuracy of the model 
                                                                                                                                
forms persists in the modern world, despite its illegality.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2010, http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/142979.pdf. 
 10  See Convention on Int’l Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, Mar. 23, 1973, 999 U.N.T.S. 243; Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources, The IUCN Red List of Threatened Species, 
http://www.iucnredlist.org. 
 11  See 18th Int’l Conference of Labour Statisticians, Report III – Child Labour 
Statistics, Geneva, Switz., Dec. 5, 2008. 
 12   I focus on the treatment of animals in industrialized agriculture, because 
that context provides the closest analogy to child labor.  In so doing, I do not make 
any judgments about animal rights vs. animal welfare, or the proper extent or content 
of regulation, and I do not minimize the myriad other concerns of animal advocates.  
See, e.g., Neil D. Hamilton, One Bad Day: Thoughts on the Difference Between Animal 
Rights and Animal Welfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 138 (2008); Gary L. 
Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain Without Thunder, 
70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 10-11 (2007) (discussing differences in animal rights and 
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and suggest how modern societal developments may affect the 
analysis.  This article focuses primarily on how legal reform, mainly in 
the form of legislative action, may be achieved, although it recognizes 
that significant and possibly even more important change may occur 
outside that context.  For example, legal reform may include judicially 
recognized rights (common law)13 or even constitutional changes,14 
which may go beyond those achieved in the legislature.  Moreover, the 
development of new ethical boundaries may reinforce and even 
transcend legal reform, finding concrete expression in powerful ways, 
such as consumer action forcing changes in company practices.15 
The process of legislative reform proceeds in recognizable 
stages, although the stages may overlap.  In the first stage, the need for 
protection of powerless groups arises when conditions begin to 
significantly deteriorate due to the economic pressures of market 
industrialization (“competitive deterioration”).  The article explores the 
similarities in this competitive deterioration in the industrial and 
agricultural revolutions.  In both situations, industrialists initially use 
free market ideology to tamp down protests and reform efforts.  
 In the second stage, however, pressure for reform grows as a 
new ethical/moral imperative develops.  How such ethical change 
occurs is a complex subject, explored in great volumes of social science 
literature.  This article uses the insights of new social movement theory 
to trace the development of a new norm to the combined influence of 
popular culture, triggering events, and the leadership of important 
historical figures.  The new ethical imperative, however, must be 
coupled with the formation of an adequate interest group structure to 
achieve effective political pressure.  In addition, progressive theorists 
help by articulating the language and philosophy necessary to counter 
                                                                                                                                
animal welfare agendas).  Rather, my inquiry is this: if one accepts that animals are 
being mistreated by humans to further economic ends, how might reform be 
achieved?   
 13   See Paul Schiff Berman, An Observation and a Strange But True "Tale": What 
Might the Historical Trials of Animals Tell Us About the Transformative Potential of Law in 
American Culture?, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 123, 144-45 (2000) (describing courts' function of 
providing forum for competing narratives to facilitate changes in social norms). 
 14   See Kate M. Nattrass, Comment, "…Und die Tiere": Constitutional 
Protection for Germany's Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 283 (2004) (discussing implications of 
Germany's constitutional amendment adding language protecting animals).  
 15   See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
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free-market arguments.  Finally, changes in the economic equation may 
be achieved by consumer action (boycotts, e.g.) and impact litigation, 
adding to the pressure for reform.  Marshalling whatever economic 
forces may benefit by reform legislation may be crucial to significant 
reform. 
Even after the initial legislative protection is achieved, however, 
the history of child labor reform reveals that the battle is far from over.  
In the final stage of the reform model, reformers must deal with the 
backlash from those economic interests threatened by change.  In this 
stage, reformers must counter efforts to weaken legislation through 
exceptions or loopholes (by legislative amendment or administrative 
interpretation) or by the failure to provide funds for adequate 
enforcement.  Even when effective domestic protection is achieved, the 
tendency to export the problem to foreign competitors shifts the reform 
effort to the international level, through treaties and trade restrictions.  
While the economic pressures for deterioration remain, the model has 
no true termination point – only a final stage of monitoring that 
effectively lasts forever, much like a cancer in remission.     
The model, which is set out in graphical form at the end of this 
article, illustrates that reform in the case of powerless groups is never 
easy and never quick.  Child labor reform efforts began in the early 
1800s, but stretched over three-quarters of a century before effective 
domestic reform was achieved and the problem persists at the 
international level despite two centuries of effort.  Yet, despite the 
obstacles, success did occur at the domestic level and progress is being 
made internationally.  Thus, the history of child labor reform provides 
some useful lessons for modern reform efforts on behalf of animals.16 
                                                 
 16   In constructing this reform model, I am mindful of Peter Schuck's 
observations: 
 
Ambitious, broad-ranging theories about large social phenomena 
inevitably invite disappointment and disagreement.  Creative, 
useful theory-building in social science demands radical 
simplification; realities must be stripped of their complexity.  
Finding the appropriate level of factual detail is one of the 
theorist's most difficult challenges.  It is almost always possible to 
say of such theories, therefore, that they overgeneralize, 
overlooking important contextual details that render their 
hypotheses contingently, rather than universally, true. 
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I. Theories of Political Economy 
 This article attempts to develop a model for how legislative 
reform on behalf of powerless groups, such as animals, may be 
achieved, primarily through an examination of the history of child 
labor reform.  It will be helpful, therefore, to view this historical 
evidence through the lens (or lenses) of political science theories 
concerning how legislatures behave.  This inquiry does not require us 
to adopt a universally descriptive theory of political economy; instead, 
each theory may add something to our understanding of the historical 
data and our ability to construct a predictive model.  Because both 
animal welfare reform and child labor reform spring from moral 
grounds, we must first confront the debate within social science theory 
as to the role of altruistic motivations in political behavior. 
A.  Pluralist, Public Choice and Civic Republican Theory 
  
Traditional political science analysis begins with the pluralist 
view of the political process, which sees competing interest groups, 
none of whom command a majority, making law through a dynamic 
process requiring factions with distinct agendas to form coalitions to 
achieve legislative goals.17  Because each person may identify with a 
diverse set of groups, no monolithic power structure can develop.  In 
the child labor situation, pluralist theorists would emphasize that 
reform was achieved only when labor unions, representing the 
unemployment concerns of employed adults, joined with religious 
groups and others who sought reform based on moral concerns.  The 
traditional pluralist view, however, tended to view the formation and 
                                                                                                                                
Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Economic Growth, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 359, 367 (1984) 
(review essay).  Thus, I recognize that for purposes of this article the complex history 
of child labor, abolition, and animal welfare reforms have been "stripped of their 
complexity" to allow some useful generalizations to be made. 
 17   William J. Chambliss, On Lawmaking, in MAKING LAW: THE STATE, THE 
LAW, AND STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS 4 (William J Chambliss & Marjorie S. Zatz 
eds., 1993); Schuck, supra note 16, at 360-62; DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, 
LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 13-14 (1991). 
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operation of interest groups as a relatively "open, unimpeded process," 
which would naturally lead to "socially desirable equilibria."18 
 Critiques of the pluralist vision focused on the skewed nature of 
this process.  For example, scholars noted that, far from a freely 
available legislative market, interest group politics was skewed toward 
"narrow economic interests."19  One branch of this approach produced 
instrumental ruling class theory, which posits that dominant class 
interests are behind changes in legislation.20  Legislation often may 
placate minority groups while still serving the interests of the power 
elite.  For example, revisionist historian Gabriel Kolko suggested that 
sanitary measures in the meat-packing industry came about not 
because of concern for health, but because larger firms believed that the 
cost of increased regulation would give them a competitive advantage 
over smaller firms.21  Many environmental laws could be analyzed 
similarly; larger firms had the ability to install expensive pollution 
control equipment and pass those costs on to consumers, while smaller 
firms did not.22  To the extent that morality comes into the equation, it 
is typically seen as merely justifying the economic exploitations of the 
ruling class.  The working class is of course not powerless in this 
equation, because it has the ability to protest, strike, and otherwise gum 
up the machinery of the ruling class.23 
 More broadly, public choice theorists conclude that most 
legislation results from the rent-seeking efforts of well-organized 
interest groups.24  All of the participants in the legislative process, 
                                                 
 18  Schuck, supra note 16, at 360. 
 19   Farber & Frickey, supra note 17, at 19 (noting that "[t]here are few 
lobbyists for consumers, but many for producers"). 
 20  Chambliss, supra note 17, at 4-5. 
 21  GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A RE-INTERPRETATION OF 
AMERICAN HISTORY (1963). 
 22  See Chambliss, supra note 17, at 20 (law may be "used as a subtle means of 
increasing monopoly by creating law which gives an advantage to the largest firms in 
a particular industry").  Similarly, in legal scholarship, “[p]ublic choice theorists trace 
most or all regulation to rent-seeking, arguing that any ostensibly public-regarding 
regulation that does emerge must have been designed to favor rent-seeking 
concentrated interests, such as subgroups of the regulated industry attempting to 
burden their rivals.”  Jonathan Baert Weiner, On the Political Economy of Global 
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 754-55 (1999). 
 23  Chambliss & Zatz, supra note 17, at 20. 
 24  Weiner, supra note 22, at 754-55 (“Public choice theorists trace most or all 
regulation to rent-seeking, arguing that any ostensibly public-regarding regulation 
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including special interest groups, lobbyists, and legislators, are 
presumed to be "rational self-interest maximizers."25  Thus, individuals 
will actively pursue legislative goals only when the benefits to them 
exceed the costs of doing so.26  Mancur Olson’s work on rational choice 
posited that ordinary citizens seeking broadly dispersed public benefits 
will refrain from activism, because the costs of participation would 
clearly outweigh the individual benefits, especially if those benefits 
could be expected to accrue anyway from the work of others.27  Under 
this theory, politics should be dominated by groups with a narrow self-
interest, seeking direct benefits to themselves ("rent-seeking") that 
outweigh the costs of political action.28  Pure economic public choice 
models reject ideology as a "significant factor in the political process."29 
 The insights of public choice theory can help explain the 
difficulty of enacting legislative reform, such as child labor or animal 
welfare regulation, despite broad public support, when industrialists 
with concentrated economic self-interests dominate the political 
landscape.  Certainly, any social welfare movement focused on benefits 
to powerless groups should be doomed to fail under this theory of 
rational self-interested behavior.  Nevertheless, the empirical evidence 
from many political events, such as the civil rights era, indicates that 
not all legislative action results from economic self-interest.30  At least 
some public choice theorists recognize that citizens may derive 
satisfaction from helping others and, in fact, may be more willing to 
pursue altruistic goals in political decisions than in market decisions, 
                                                                                                                                
that does emerge must have been designed to favor rent-seeking concentrated 
interests, such as subgroups of the regulated industry attempting to burden their 
rivals.”).  See, e.g., Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, 
Symbol and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1392-93 (1993) (noting that 
many public choice theorists attribute Wagner Act to rent-seeking behavior by labor 
groups). 
 25   Maxwell L. Stearns, The Public Choice Case Against the Item Veto, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 385, 399 (1992).   
 26   Id. at 400.   
 27  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).  One 
indication of Olson’s influence in legal academia: a Westlaw search of his name 
generates 1829 hits in the JLR (journals and law reviews – US) database (last searched 
11/22/2010).  And now, of course, there will be one more. 
 28   Farber & Frickey, supra note 17, at 892-93. 
 29   Id. at 893. 
 30  Herbert Hovencamp, Legislation, Well-Being and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 63, 88 (1990).   
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where the individual cost is higher.31  Thus, while public choice theory 
emphasizes economic self-interest, there is grudging recognition that 
ideological motives may also play an important role in political 
action.32 
 Civic republican theorists go further, arguing that government 
actors themselves play a crucial role in shaping or changing public 
preferences, in furtherance of societal good.33  "Rather than 
mechanically processing preferences, government involves an 
intellectual search for the morally correct answer."34  Whereas public 
choice theory may be unable to explain legislation that seems 
antithetical to economic interests, civic republicans believe that voters, 
and politicians, are motivated by a broader range of preferences, many 
of which may further altruistic principles that trump individual 
economic interests.35 
 The success of animal welfare reform thus may depend on 
whether civic republican theory is correct: whether there is any hope 
for legislation based on moral values that threatens entrenched 
economic interests.  Paradoxically, animal welfare reform theory is 
usually housed in the larger sphere of environmental activism, which 
seems in the last two decades to have been heavily influenced by the 
public choice approach.  The origins of the modern environmental 
movement, in contrast, rested more explicitly on an ethical basis.36  
                                                 
 31 See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and 
Misunderstanding) Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey), 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 
(1988).  This may suggest, perhaps, that individuals may be more willing to vote for 
humane animal treatment regulations than to pay double the price at the market for 
humanely-raised products. 
 32   Id. at 1002 ("Ideological convictions and private interests interact in ways 
that the public choice approach can examine fruitfully").  Nevertheless, the authors 
concede that people who "are willing to make large personal sacrifices for their 
political ideals" are not accounted for in the public choice model.  Id. at 996-97. 
 33  Farber & Frickey, supra note 17, at 44.   
 34   Id. 
 35   See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong With 
Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509 (1979).  
 36   Aldo Leopold, for example, based his call for environmental change on 
the development of a new land ethic.  ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 201-
226 (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (1949) (chapter: "The Land Ethic").  While Rachel 
Carson's call to arms contained appeals to human health and other anthropocentric 
arguments, it is also peppered with moral arguments.  In one representative passage, 
she asks "whether any civilization can wage relentless war on life without destroying 
itself, and without losing the right to be called civilized."  RACHEL CARSON, SILENT 
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Even into the 1980s, leading environmental theorists argued for change 
based on ethics rather than economics.37 
 For the most part, however, modern environmentalists seem to 
have given up hope that significant reform will be founded on 
morality.  Instead, they seem intent on fitting environmental goals into 
the market-based equation.38  Environmental regulation is explained, 
under a form of public choice analysis, as resulting from “a hybrid 
coalition of populist agenda-setters and parochial rent-seekers.”39  
While ideological concerns may be the main impetus behind the law 
(clean air or water, e.g.), corporate rent-seekers control the details of the 
legislation, which the public does not have the ability or inclination to 
monitor.40   
 As a result of this shift in emphasis, environmental theory has 
become increasingly occupied with ensuring that the true value of 
environmental goods is accurately reflected in cost-benefit analysis.  
For example, scholars have developed non-market valuation techniques 
to ensure that societal decision-making takes full account of the 
functions provided by ecosystems and biodiversity.41  Researchers have 
begun, according to one of the leading texts, "to fill in the very large 
hole of knowledge surrounding how ecologically important ecosystem 
attributes are economically valuable services to humans.”42  The logical 
                                                                                                                                
SPRING 99 (1962).  After describing the "horrible" deaths of "innocent" creatures, she 
concludes: "By acquiescing in an act that can cause such suffering to a living creature, 
who among us is not diminished as a human being?" Id. at 100. 
 37  See, e.g., MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988) (arguing that market failure is not the basis for social 
regulation such as environmental law); PAUL V. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A 
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986) (arguing for biocentric theory of 
environmental ethics).  
 38  See e.g., NICK HANLEY, JASON F. SHOGREN, & BEN WHITE, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2007); Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and 
Environmentalism: Finding Environmental Justice's Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002) (environmental regulation based on market failure 
theory). 
 39  Weiner, supra note 22, at 761. 
 40   Id. at 760.  See also B. Peter Pashigan, The Effect of Environmental Regulation 
on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J. L. & ECON. 1, 26 (1984) (environmental 
regulation places "disproportionate burden" of compliance on smaller plants). 
 41  Id. at 356-82. 
 42   J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY 
OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 24 (2007) (emphasis in original). 
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extension of this approach involves finding economic gains in 
preserving wildlife or preventing deforestation through ecotourism.43 
 It is undoubtedly important to ensure that society recognizes the 
economic benefits of environmental protection.  The ecosystem services 
literature, in particular, helps society to fully appreciate the 
consequences of allowing destruction of our resources.  Nevertheless, 
the emphasis on economic balancing may indirectly undermine 
reforms, such as animal welfare regulation, that are based almost 
entirely on morality.  Does society have a responsibility to protect 
animals, for example, even if there is no discernable economic benefit, 
or even when it is demonstrably contrary to our economic self-
interest?44  The choice of argument might be altered if it were more 
fully informed by historical analysis of how altruistic reform efforts 
were able to succeed.    
B.   New Social Movement Theory 
 
Modern social movement theories explain the political process in 
ways that provide more complex, but ultimately more useful, 
information for future reformers.  For example, modern sociologists 
have built upon rational choice ideas to create a “resource 
mobilization” theory of collective action.  Resource mobilization 
focuses on “rational actors engaged in instrumental action through 
formal organization to secure resources and foster mobilization.”45  
Whereas traditional theory assumed that collective action was a direct 
result of some deprivation or grievance, the new theory recognizes that 
the feelings of individual citizens are insufficient in themselves to 
create political change.  Instead, action requires the creation of a 
                                                 
 43 Katherine Mapes, Expanding Ecotourism: Embedding Environmental 
Sustainability in Panama’s Burgeoning Tourism Industry, 33 HARV. ENVTL L. REV 225 
(2009); Marla Kerr, Ecotourism: Alleviating the Negative Effects of Deforestation on 
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, 14 COLO. J. OF INT'L ENVTL L. & POL’Y 335 (2003). 
 44  In recent years, Hope Babcock has at least begun the inquiry into how we 
might influence individual behavior regarding the environment through 
development of new norms.  Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility For 
Improving the Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 117 (2009) (exploring role of norms as method of influencing behavior). 
 45   Steven M. Beuchler, New Social Movement Theories, 36 SOC. Q. 441, 441 
(Summer 1995) (calling resource mobilization the “dominant paradigm for studying 
collective action in the United States”). 
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process, including organizations to carry forward group goals, attract 
financial support, and create political relationships.46    
Rational choice models rely, however, on the faulty assumption 
that individuals always can be expected to act in ways that maximize 
their own benefits or reduce their own costs.  The economic model 
seems to ignore the importance of other motivators of human behavior, 
such as culture or ideology.47  In response to this shortcoming, some 
sociologists are using new social movement theory to explain collective 
behavior that is motivated by interests other than simple material 
gain.48  Ironically, new social movement theory developed initially in 
response to the economic reductionism of Marxism, “the assumption 
that a single economic logic provides the unity of a social formation 
and determines its political and ideological processes.”49     
Part of the effort to link ideology with the organizations and 
political processes central to resource mobilization theory is the concept 
of “framing.”50  Critical to building support for a political idea, 
“framing” consists of a process in which “enterprising agents within 
social movements draw from existing mentalities and political culture 
to manipulate the symbols necessary for creating action-oriented 
frames of meaning that will mobilize others on behalf of movement 
goals.”51  In order to convince people that action is necessary, activists 
construct their own narrative of events and create symbols to quickly 
and efficiently carry their ideas to the public and link them to “themes 
                                                 
 46  Eduardo Canel, New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization 
Theory: The Need for Integration, in COMMUNITY POWER AND GRASSROOTS DEMOCRACY: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL LIFE 189 (M. Kaufman & H. Dilla Alfonso eds., 1997), 
http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-54446-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. 
 47  Ideology may be defined as “systems of ideas which couple 
understanding of how the world works with ethical, moral, and normative principles 
that guide personal and collective action.”  Pamela E. Oliver & Hank Johnston, What a 
Good Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research, in FRAMES OF PROTEST: 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE FRAMING PERSPECTIVE 185, 192 (Hank Johnston & John A. 
Noakes eds., 2005).  
 48   Rubin, supra note 5, at 1; Beuchler, supra note 45, at 442; Ronald Inglehart, 
Values, Ideology and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements, in CHALLENGING 
THE POLITICAL ORDER: NEW SOCIAL AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN 
DEMOCRACIES 43 (Russell J. Dalton & Manfred Kuechler eds., 1990). 
 49 Canel, supra note 46; Beuchler, supra note 45, at 441-42. 
 50  Oliver & Johnston, supra note 47, at 185. 
 51  Carol McClurg Mueller, Building Social Movement Theory, in FRONTIERS IN 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 3, 14 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 
1992). 
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or values in the cultural stock.”52  Similarly, Grattet suggested that how 
a legal change takes shape “depends on the mobilization of material 
and symbolic power.”53  Material resources include institutions and 
organizations that distribute information and points of view.  Symbolic 
resources include monikers like “social justice” that can be used to 
mobilize political power.54  For example, as discussed below, factory 
farms have been able to frame the animal welfare issue in terms of free 
market ideals and the continuing myth of agriculture's "husbandry" 
ethic.  Reform may depend on the welfare movement's ability to re-
frame the issue in symbolic terms of equivalent cultural power. 
 Scholarship on the dynamic interaction between positive law 
and social norms can also aid the inquiry.55  These sociologists view 
human society as a complex social system, in which individual, 
decentralized interactions result in system-level phenomena, such as 
the emergence of new norms.56  Palma Strand uses this scholarship to 
illustrate the cyclical interaction between law and community, in which 
the collaborative development of societal norms takes place.57  In her 
"law-as-story" description, "the substantive content of a story and its 
ultimate ratification lie with the community."58  Unlike some of the 
discouraging implications of public choice theory, this concept of norm 
development suggests a constructive roadmap for individuals seeking 
to change society.59  
 Thus, new social movement theories can help us analyze 
instances, such as animal welfare and child labor, in which the group to 
be protected is truly powerless and those seeking reform are primarily 
motivated by moral concerns rather than economic self-interest.   By 
                                                 
 52  John A. Noakes & Hank Johnston, Frames of Protest: A Road Map to a 
Perspective, in FRAMES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE FRAMING PERSPECTIVE, 
supra note 47 at 1, 9. 
 53 Ryken Grattet, Structural Contradictions and the Production of New Legal 
Institutions: The Transformation of Industrial Accident Law Revisited, in MAKING LAW: THE 
STATE, THE LAW, AND STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 17, at 404, 407.            
 54  Id. at 412-413. 
 55  Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); Palma 
Joy Strand, Law as Story: A Civic Concept of Law (with Constitutional Illustrations), 18 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 603, 620-24 (2009).  
 56  See generally, R. KEITH SAWYER, SOCIAL EMERGENCE: SOCIETIES AS COMPLEX 
SYSTEMS (2005). 
 57  Strand, supra note 55, at 620-24. 
 58  Id. at 626.   
 59  Id. at 647, n. 232 (stressing importance of civic organizing). 
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examining the stages of child labor reform through the social 
movement lens, we can identify how symbolic and material resources 
gradually accumulated, finally leading to legislative action.   
 
II. Protection for the Powerless: The Stages of Reform 
 The story of how children during the Industrial Revolution in 
Britain came to be exploited by industry and ultimately rescued by 
Parliament provides an excellent model for how protection for 
powerless groups may be achieved.  This section will trace through 
each stage in this reform process, comparing the history of child labor 
regulation with the modern campaign for animal welfare protection.  
 “Child labor” is a vague term that could refer to kids mowing 
the lawn, milking the cows on the farm, or sacking groceries down at 
the local supermarket.  At some point, however, the labor of children 
can turn from beneficial after-school chores to abusive exploitation.  
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) defines “child labor” to 
be “work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and 
their dignity, and that is harmful to physical and mental 
development.”60  A number of factors may be used to determine 
whether work is harmful, including the type of work performed, the 
number of hours worked, the age of the child, and the conditions of the 
employment.  A key indicator is whether it interferes with the child’s 
opportunity to attend school.  This article will use the ILO definition in 
referring to child labor. 
 During the Industrial Revolution, thousands of children were 
employed in Britain’s factories, in jobs and under conditions that few 
would argue were healthy or appropriate.  The 1851 census in Britain 
indicated that over 36% of boys and almost 20% of girls between the 
ages of 10 and 14 were working.61  About a third of those boys were 
employed in agriculture and fisheries, where working conditions in 
some cases may have been less detrimental, but large percentages were 
in workshops, factories, mines and quarries.  About half of the girls 
                                                 
 60  International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, 
International Labour Organization, About child labour, http://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts 
/lang--en/index.htm. 
 61  Kaushik Basu & Pham Hoang Van, The Economics of Child Labor, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 414 (1998). 
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were employed in textile factories and workshops.62  All told, about 
76,000 boys aged 10-14 were employed in mines or factories and 
around 74,000 girls aged 10-14 were employed in factories that year.63   
Even younger children could be used; in 1851, some 42,000 children 
from ages 5 to 9 were working.64  
 In Britain, legislative attempts to regulate child labor began in 
1802, with a bill to improve conditions for apprentices, although 
significant reform did not occur until the Factory Acts of 1819 and 
1833.65  Even then, the legislation was relatively narrow and not 
effectively enforced.66  The legislative response stretched, by fits and 
starts, until the late 19th century.67  In the U.S., the cycle of abuse and 
legislative reform came later; state legislatures acted first, in the late 
1800s and early 1900s, enacting a variety of age and hour limitations, 
along with compulsory education requirements.68  The federal 
government did not become involved until the New Deal era, enacting 
child labor restrictions as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938. 
 While the U.S. and Britain have largely eradicated abusive child 
labor, the problem has been exported, in effect, to less developed 
countries.  Worldwide some 191 million children aged 5-14, or about 
one-sixth of that age group, were engaged in some kind of economic 
activity in 2004.69  While this represents about 20 million fewer working 
                                                 
 62  Kirby, supra note 2, at 52-53. 
 63  Id. at 54.  
 64  Id. at 112. 
 65  William F. Willoughby, Child Labor, 5 PUBL’N OF THE AM. ECON. ASS’N 5 
(1890).  See also B.L. HUTCHINS AND A. HARRISON, A HISTORY OF FACTORY LEGISLATION 
7 (2nd ed. 1911); Palma Joy Strand, The Factory Act of 1819, at 5-6 (1975) (unpublished 
paper on file with author). 
 66  S.G. CHECKLAND, THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY IN ENGLAND, 1815-1885 
246 (1964) (Factory Act of 1819 applied only to cotton mills and contained only 
modest restrictions on working hours, which were almost never enforced); 
Willoughby, supra note 65, at 20 (criticizing 1833 Act); Kirby, supra note 2, at 104-110 
(describing failure of early Factory Acts). 
 67   Kirby, supra note 2, at 94 (detailing the narrow impact of 19th century 
child labor regulation until 1870s). 
 68 Carolyn M. Moehling, State Child Labor Laws and the Decline of Child Labor, 
36 EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 72 (1999) (noting that by 1910, 32 U.S. states had 
enacted a minimum age limit of 14 for manufacturing operations); E. Watson Kenyon, 
Child Labor, 2 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 54-55 (1907). 
 69  Federico Blanco Allais & Frank Hagemann, Child Labour and Education: 
Evidence from SIMPOC Surveys 1 (International Labour Organization, Working Paper, 
2008), www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id=8390. 
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children than four years earlier, the number is still staggering.  In 
addition, 75 million children of primary school age worldwide were out 
of school in 2006 (improved from 103 million in 1999).70 
 In 1816, Sir Robert Peel testified before Parliament that children 
employed in the factories and mills were sent there either by parents or 
guardians who could no longer afford their care, or by the local parish, 
which wanted to relieve its welfare rolls.71  The children, Peel noted, 
"are not parties to any contract; they are of too tender an age to make 
any agreement; the agreement must be made by others, by an overseer, 
or by the poor mother who has no husband, or by the father."72  
Similarly, William F. Willoughby described the powerless state of 
working children in his exposition of the child labor problem: 
 
[T]here is a rapidly growing class of laborers who are 
not in a position to demand anything from their 
employers.  Children, weak, helpless and uneducated 
are immured at the tenderest years in mills and 
workshops, to undergo severe and tenuous toil.  
Incapable of organization they grow up in ignorance 
and crime; unaccustomed to anything but the lowest 
condition, they are without ability or ambition to 
improve their situation.  The state alone is in a position 
to remedy this by suitable legislation and to put them 
in a position where they can help themselves.73  
 
Thus, children were “powerless” in that they were unable to 
seek reform of the system on their own, just as animals are 
today.   
In this first section, I will describe how competitive pressures 
during the Industrial Revolution led to increasing abuse of child 
laborers and how industrialists were able counter any reform efforts 
with free market rhetoric.  This stage of competitive deterioration of 
                                                 
 70  Id. 
 71  House of Lords, Sessional Papers 1801-33, vol. 92 (1818), at 136 (testimony 
of Sir Robert Peel).  In the case of pauper children, the parish workhouse might 
appropriated the children's wages.  Kirby, supra note 2, at 39. 
 72  Sessional Papers, supra note 71, at 136. 
 73 Willoughby, supra note 65, at 9. 
Anderson Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy | Vol. 4  
(2011) 
 
 21 
course parallels the condition of animals in the modern industrialized 
agriculture revolution. 
A.   Industrialization  
  
The dramatic shift from the family farm to industrialized 
agriculture that has occurred over the last several decades, with the 
concomitant upheavals in rural society, in many ways mirrors the shift 
to factory labor in Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  Prior to 1760, most manufacture, of everything from cloth to 
furniture, was done in the home or in small enterprises.  Society was 
primarily agrarian, with small landholdings providing basic food 
needs.  In a traditional family, every member had his or her job to do, 
from milking the cow to gathering fuel.  While one can have no 
romantic notions concerning the hardship of daily life, the family was 
largely self-employed and independent.  During the Industrial 
Revolution, production shifted from small towns to larger factories in 
big cities, resulting in a complete “remaking of society.”74  
The causes of the Industrial Revolution have been exhaustively 
treated elsewhere; for the purpose of this article, they can be briefly 
summarized to illustrate the similarities to the modern agricultural 
revolution.  Several developments in the late 1700s drove the 
transformation of society.  First, inventions made it possible to do by 
machine what before required hand labor, making factories possible.  
For example, the invention of the spinning machine in 1767 began a 
profound change in the way manufacturing of textiles would thereafter 
be conducted.75  The improvement of machinery (e.g., the power loom 
in 1787, the cotton gin in 1793) and the subdivision of labor into small, 
repetitive tasks allowed children to perform as effectively as adults.76  
Second, market forces contributed to industrialization by 
increasing production needs and making it economically desirable to 
convert common land into private land (enclosure).  The enclosure of 
common land, which increased significantly from 1760 to 1840, 
deprived countless commoners of access to land necessary for their 
                                                 
 74  Checkland, supra note 66, at 3. 
 75  Sir Edward Baines, History of the Cotton Manufacture in Great Britain, in E. 
Royston Pike, HARD TIMES: HUMAN DOCUMENTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 31-32 
(1966). 
 76  Willoughby, supra note 65, at 11. 
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sustenance, in turn driving them to cities and providing a labor pool 
that would both produce factory goods and consume them.  Common 
rights had allowed a villager to graze cattle on a common pasture, 
gather wood, gorse or peat for fuel on the manor’s wasteland, or turn 
out pigs into fields after harvest to glean the remaining grain.  These 
valuable rights were lost during the conversion of common land into 
private property, leaving villagers with no means of support other than 
to join the industrial labor force.77 
 The Industrial Revolution completely changed the way in which 
people worked, including the employer-employee relationship.  In the 
transformation from an agrarian to an industrialized society, “the pace 
and context [of work] were no longer tied to the traditional tempo and 
conditions of nature.”78  Instead, the conditions were determined solely 
by the employer, who had neither the time nor inclination to worry 
about workers' needs and health.  Moreover, the workers themselves, at 
least before labor unions were formed, were relatively helpless to 
combat the inhumane conditions.  Instead of the close tie between 
master and apprentice, the new breed of employer employed hundreds 
of workers, who were for the most part complete strangers, and as a 
result personal relationships provided no check on the treatment of the 
worker.79 
 Similarly, the industrialization of agriculture that occurred over 
the last half of the 20th century completely transformed rural society 
and the nature of farming.  In 1935, there were 6.8 million farms in the 
United States; in 2002, only 2.1 million remained.  The average acreage 
per farm increased from 155 to 441 over the same period.80  Livestock is 
now raised primarily in large confinement operations; for example, the 
number of farm operations raising hogs dropped from around 325,000 
in 1988 to around 56,000 in 2007.  The majority of hogs in the United 
                                                 
 77  Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s 
Bundle of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 375, 383-90 (2007).  See also Checkland, 
supra note 66 (proportion of working population engaged in farming fell from 35 per 
cent to 16 per cent between 1801 and 1851). 
 78  Checkland, supra note 66, at 244. 
 79  Arnold Toynbee, LECTURES ON THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: 
POPULAR ADDRESSES, NOTES, AND OTHER FRAGMENTS 88 (1884). 
 80  U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., Structure and Finances of U.S. Farms: 
2005 Family Farm Report, EIB-12 (2006), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ 
EIB12/EIB12.pdf . 
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States (54 % in 2007) are now raised by operators who own over 50,000 
head.81 
 Just as employers lost a personal relationship with their 
employees in the industrial revolution, the rise of corporate agriculture 
severed the link between farmer and animal.  The typical farmer in the 
early twentieth century knew every animal on the farm.  The hogs ate 
the remains of the family's own meal; the milk from the cow and the 
eggs from the hens would be breakfast.82   In the modern confinement 
operation, food and water is provided mechanically and hired help 
checks in periodically, but the average corporate CAFO operator has no 
more personal relationship with the thousands of animals in his care 
(labeled "inputs" in the agricultural literature now) than the average 
industrial factory owner had with the girl running the loom.  As a 
result, the stage was set for deterioration of animal welfare conditions, 
mirroring the abuse of workers in the industrial revolution. 
1. Competitive Deterioration 
 As the industrial revolution shifted production to factories, 
competition resulted in a significant deterioration of working 
conditions.  The labor environment in most early industrial factories 
has been characterized as abominable, horrifying and disgusting.83  
Workers in British cotton mills, for example, labored fourteen-hour 
days in extreme heat, locked in rooms without a breath of fresh air and 
minimal access to water.  Even pregnant women worked back-breaking 
hours and were fined by the supervisor for taking any rest.  Accidents 
were frequent, causing “dreadful mutilations,”84 and of course factory 
owners were not responsible for an injured worker’s medical treatment 
or subsequent survival.   
                                                 
 81  U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., FARMS, LAND IN 
FARMS, AND LIVESTOCK OPERATIONS 2007 SUMMARY 33 (2008), 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/usda/nass/FarmLandIn//2000s/2007/FarmLandI
n-02-02-2007.pdf . 
 82  Arran Stibbe, As Charming as a Pig: The Discursive Construction of the 
Relationship Between Pigs and Humans, 11 SOCIETY & ANIMALS 375 (2003) (describing 
close relationship between people and pigs in Victorian Britain). 
 83  P.P. Lords, Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population, in 
HARD TIMES: HUMAN DOCUMENTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra note 75, at 72; 
William Cobbett, Political Register, in HARD TIMES: HUMAN DOCUMENTS OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra note 75, at 60-61. 
 84  Lords, supra note 83, at 72. 
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Most prominent among the abuses was the use of child labor.  
Pauper children were forced into factories at very young ages and 
worked long hours at back-breaking tasks.  Twelve to sixteen hour days 
were the rule.85  In one mill, for example, children as young as seven 
years old worked from 5 a.m. to 8 p.m. Monday through Saturday all 
year round, with just half an hour for breakfast and half an hour for 
lunch.86  On Sunday, they had to work only six hours.  They stood at 
their places the whole day, never sitting, and frequently crushed their 
fingers in the machinery.87  The hard labor deformed many of the 
children and many were beaten savagely to force them to work.88  
In British coal mines, where in the early 1800s about one-third of 
all laborers were under eighteen, children crawled through narrow 
seams underground, dragging heavily loaded cars of coal, or were used 
as trappers, operating the underground ventilation system.89  In its 1842 
Mines Report, Parliament reported that even children under five years 
old worked as trappers for up to twelve hours a day and pre-teen girls 
repeatedly carried such heavy baskets of coal that their spines became 
deformed.90  
 Reform was a long time in coming, primarily because the 
oppressed workers, and in particular the children, did not hold much 
power in Parliament.  Parents did not push for reform, because the 
family’s economic survival often depended on the children’s income.  
Even when reform was proposed, industrialists argued that the use of 
child labor was both necessary economically and not so bad for the 
kids.  Sir Edward Baines, for example, wrote a defense of child labor, 
arguing that although factory work required long hours, it was not too 
arduous.  Sometimes the children could sit down on the job, he wrote, 
and although being shut up for long hours without air or sun “makes 
                                                 
 85  Willoughby, supra note 65, at 16.  
 86  Report on Children in Manufacturies, in  HARD TIMES: HUMAN DOCUMENTS 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra note 75, at 85-86.  See also Sessional Papers, 
supra note 71, at 145 (children at factories in Manchester worked from 5 a.m. to 8 p.m. 
with 40 minutes for dinner; 82 hours per week) (testimony of Thomas Whitelegg). 
 87  Report on Children in Manufacturies, supra note 86, at 86. 
 88  HARD TIMES: HUMAN DOCUMENTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra 
note 75, at 75-204 (collecting many first-hand accounts of the treatment of children in 
the factories and mines and reports of the deformities occasioned by the hard labor at 
a young age).  
 89  Willoughby, supra note 65, at 17; Kirby, supra note 2, at 78. 
 90  National Museum of Wales, Children in Coal Mines: The 1842 Report, 
http://www.museumwales.ac.uk/en/2191/. 
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[the children] pale, and reduces their vigour, . . . it rarely brings on 
disease.”91  Others noted that work at least was better than starvation 
for the children, and besides, it kept them out of trouble.92 
In his history of the Industrial Revolution in England, S.G. 
Checkland labels this inevitable march toward declining working 
conditions “competitive deterioration,” 93 also known as a “race to the 
bottom.”  Unchecked, the forces of capitalism led factories to seek ever 
cheaper means to produce ever more goods.  This meant longer hours 
at lower wages, increasingly poor accommodations and conditions, and 
increasing reliance on the cheapest laborers, i.e. children.   
Just as competitive forces led to the deterioration of working 
conditions in the Industrial Revolution, livestock agriculture has 
experienced the competitive deterioration of animal welfare.94  The 
most prominent change in production is the confinement of animals 
indoors for their entire lives, in cages or pens that restrict their 
movements.  In a typical egg-laying operation today, for example, 
chickens are kept by the millions in stacks of battery (group) cages 
within huge windowless warehouses.95  The cages are small, allowing 
                                                 
 91  Baines, supra note 75, at 213. 
 92  W. Cooke Taylor, Factories and the Factory System, in HARD TIMES: HUMAN 
DOCUMENTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, supra note 75, at 210-11.  The attempts to 
justify the use of child labor continue even among modern writers.  For example, 
Clark Nardinelli argues that the employment of children freed them from abusive 
parents and difficult economic circumstances.  He concludes: “Industrialization, far 
from being the source of the enslavement of children, was the source of their 
liberation.”  CLARK NARDINELLI, CHILD LABOR AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 102 
(1990).  See also Kirby, supra note 2, at 3 (“the very coherence of family life often 
depended upon the economic contributions of children”).  While it is important to 
recognize the difficult circumstances from which most of the working children came, 
the availability of cheap child labor made parents worse off by putting downward 
pressure on adult wages.  And even if employment of children was an economic 
necessity, it did not require fourteen-hour days in unventilated rooms with scarcely a 
break for food or rest.   
 93  Checkland, supra note 66, at 245. 
 94  Matheny & Leahy, supra note 6, at 327-28 (describing developments that 
led to factory farming: modern genetics allowing breeding of more productive 
animals; protein-dense nutrition; CAFO design; vaccines, antibiotics, and vitamins to 
counteract the health impacts of confinement and dietary changes). 
 95  See, e.g., Laurie Welch, Proposed Chicken, Egg Processing Plants Would Bring 
Hundreds of Jobs, Controversy to Mini-Cassia, MAGIC VALLEY TIMES-NEWS, Feb. 28, 2010, 
available at http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/article_fc565a88-6899-59e3-
a46f-f8d418e198b0.html.  The article discusses a county ordinance that limited the 
number of birds per poultry facility to 4.2 million.  A neighboring county has no such 
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each bird less space than a sheet of notebook paper, because cages are 
expensive, and larger buildings would be more expensive to build and 
maintain.96  As Professor Ibrahim has described it, “[i]ntensive 
confinement of animals is simple economics, saving on corporate 
overhead costs by reducing the amount spent on land, feed, and 
labor.”97  Because producing meat using these methods is cheaper, 
competition forces other producers to adopt factory farming or face 
extinction.98   
 It is easy to romanticize the living conditions of animals on 
traditional family farms, and conditions on modern farms can vary 
greatly by producer.  Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the 
intensive nature of modern production methods has resulted in the 
deterioration of living conditions for the vast majority of animals in 
agriculture.  Other writers have exhaustively chronicled these abuses,99 
but a brief summary here will illustrate the similarity to child labor 
abuses of the Industrial Revolution.  The practices most often criticized 
include the confinement of pigs in windowless buildings with concrete 
or slatted floors, thereby totally depriving them of access to the natural 
environment, in pens so small that they can’t move about (especially 
true of gestation crates used for pregnant sows).100  Similarly, chickens 
are kept their entire lives crowded together in small cages, unable to 
forage for food or engage in other natural behavior.101  Many operators 
de-beak the chickens, without anesthetic, because they tend to peck 
                                                                                                                                
restriction, as county commissioner Robert Moore explained: “You can't tell 
companies they can only have four million birds if they need eight million to be 
profitable.”  See also Alan Johnson, Strickland Pact Puts Union County Egg-Farm Deal in 
Doubt, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 6, 2010, available at http://www.dispatch.com/ 
live/content/local_news/stories/2010/07/06/strickland-pact-may-put-union-
county-egg-farm-in-doubt.html (proposed facility would house 400,000 chickens per 
barn in 15 barns). 
 96  Matheny & Leahy, supra note 6, at 329 (noting it is economically efficient 
to crowd poultry into smaller cages, because cages are more expensive than birds). 
 97  Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 101. 
 98  Id. at 99-105 (describing how mass production and integration lowered 
costs of production). 
 99  For detailed discussion of abuses, see Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 100-05; 
Matheny & Leahy, supra note 6, at 328-32; Jeff Leslie & Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights 
Without Controversy, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 121 (2007). 
 100  Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 100-01; see also Mosel, supra note 6 at 148-49.  
 101 Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 100. 
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each other in response to the conditions of their confinement.102  Some 
producers routinely give their animals antibiotics, before any 
symptoms of illness appear, due to a higher propensity for sickness in 
confined conditions.103  They may also routinely use hormones to 
artificially stimulate growth.104  The picture of the child laborer whose 
humanity was sacrificed to the needs of the industry is very similar to 
the picture of the average animal in industrial agriculture, which has 
become no more than an “input” in the production process. 
2. Ideological Arguments against Regulation 
Public choice theory predicts that special interests seeking 
economic gain will cloak their arguments in some kind of public 
interest rhetoric.105  Interestingly, in response to cries for reform, 
corporate agriculture raises the same basic defenses to government 
intervention as industrialists did in the nineteenth century.  First, of 
course, factory owners made an economic argument—that the 
evolution of the factory was dictated by economic necessity and any 
interference would wreak economic havoc, threatening to undermine 
industrial profits, leading to job loss and general depression.106  
Moreover, they argued that any attempt at domestic regulation would 
force industry to shift production abroad, in order to compete with 
countries with lower standards. Willoughby called the argument 
regarding foreign competition the “chief objection to any prohibition of 
[industry’s] right to employ children.”107    
                                                 
 102  Mosel, supra note 6, at 169. 
 103  Id. at 146. 
 104  Id. at 147. 
 105  As explained by Professors DeBow and Lee:  
 
Politically successful programs always will have some plausible 
connection with a worthy social objective such as helping the poor, 
saving the family farm, increasing employment opportunities, or 
protecting environmental quality.  Whether or not the programs 
actually promote these objectives, the private interests served by 
them will be adept at arguing that their programs promote great 
public good and prevent great public harm.  
 
DeBow & Lee, supra note 31, at 1004. 
 106  Checkland, supra note 66, at 247. 
 107  Willoughby, supra
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Similarly, agriculture industry advocates argue that many 
proposed animal welfare restrictions are “economically infeasible and 
unrealistic in a competitive world market.”108  Consumers demand 
consistency, owners argue, which requires factory-like conditions to 
ensure that the meat has a consistent color, texture, and leanness.109  
Owners of livestock operations are driven almost wholly by market 
considerations; as the number of production units rise, the cost per unit 
falls.110  Scully identifies economics as the central cause of abusive 
animal conditions—the so-called “race to the bottom” in which market 
competition forces companies to cut costs and increase production, 
leaving questions of animal welfare in the dustbin.  The economic 
imperative—if something can be done, it must be—proceeds without 
consideration of the moral implications or larger societal ramifications.  
If one corporation balks at an inhumane, but cost-saving, change in 
conditions, another company will surely do it and undercut the 
competition.111  Just as parents were reluctant to oppose child labor, 
due to their economic dependence on the system, many of the 
remaining farmers are now dependent on corporate agriculture for 
their economic survival.  
Second, nineteenth-century factory owners claimed that 
government control would infringe on their civil liberties, especially 
their basic right to control their property and business as they saw fit.  
Freedom of contract constituted the basic ideological argument against 
child labor reform. In the initial stages of industrialization, the 
powerful rhetoric of laissez-faire capitalism prevented government 
intrusion into the private affairs of business.  Adam Smith first 
published his Wealth of Nations in 1776, popularizing the theory of 
economic capitalism just as the industrial age began.  The economic 
benefits of free competition could be readily discerned and the 
                                                 
 108 Angela J. Geiman, It’s the Right Thing to Do: Why the Animal Agriculture 
Industry Should Not Oppose Science-Based Regulations Protecting the Welfare of Animals 
Raised for Food, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 128, 131 (2008). 
 109  MATTHEW SCULLY, DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF 
ANIMALS, AND THE CALL TO MERCY 247-86 (2002) (Chapter 6: Deliver Me from My 
Necessities). 
 110   See Ibrahim, supra note 4, at 101 (citing numerous agricultural articles 
suggesting techniques such as debeaking, limiting space, and limiting exercise to cut 
production costs). 
 111 Scully, supra note 109, at 271. 
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industrial age took full advantage.112  Smith’s theories provided a 
“great apology for individual initiative against the prohibitions of 
authority”113 and society put its faith in economic self-interest.   
Although opinions differ on the extent to which Classical 
economists embraced laissez-faire and the precise dates of its dominant 
influence over British politics, there is no doubt that the Industrial 
Revolution was fueled by the belief that “the less government 
intervention there was in any sphere the better.”114  During the debates 
on the various child labor reforms proposed in the early nineteenth 
century, the “general emphasis placed by Classical political economy 
on freedom of contract between master and man supplied an 
intellectual basis to which opponents of legislation could and did make 
appeal.”115  While the laissez-faire arguments could not, in the end, 
prevent child labor reform, for at least half a century they slowed its 
progress and limited its scope.116  In this atmosphere, when Parliament 
finally enacted a prohibition on using children under the age of ten in 
underground coal mines, an opponent described it as “perhaps the 
most high-handed interference with industry enacted by the State in 
the nineteenth century,” despite the fact that the law appointed just one 
inspector to ensure its enforcement.117   
Eventually, the force of the free market argument began to wane 
in the face of clear evidence of abuse.  Kirby suggests that “by the 1830s 
many political economists had recognized industrial child labour as a 
growing social problem and gave at least their passive support to the 
limited forms of regulation proposed at that time.  As a leading 
supporter of the short-time movement observed, ‘as men, they could 
not longer screw up their minds and hearts so far as to sacrifice any 
more limbs and lives of infants [but] the science would not suffer them 
                                                 
 112  Checkland, supra note 66, at 382. 
 113  Id. at 383. 
 114  L.C.A. KNOWLES, THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL REVOLUTIONS IN 
GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 12 (1921). 
 115  ARTHUR J. TAYLOR, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND STATE INTERVENTION IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 43 (1972).  For examples of free market arguments 
made during Parliamentary debates on child labor reform, see Sessional Papers, supra 
note 71, at 16, 38. 
 116  Taylor, supra note 115, at 44. 
 117  Id. at 58 (quoting Hutchins & Harrison, supra 
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to invade the ‘freedom of industry’ by involving the adults in that 
protection which they were obliged to give the child.’”118  
Slavery presented the same sort of direct clash between morality 
and economics presented by the child labor issue.  As the movement to 
end slavery began in the late 1700s, abolitionists confronted the same 
arguments based on economic freedom and fears of disaster.   Without 
slavery, the general wisdom ran, “the British Empire’s economy would 
collapse.”119  One trader summarized the importance of the slave trade 
as “the foundation of our commerce, the support of our colonies, the 
life of our navigation, and first cause of our national industry and 
riches.”120  The free market rhetoric began to lose force, however, when 
economists began to formulate counter-theories.  For example, Adam 
Smith himself saw slavery as antithetical to his idea that men who labor 
to obtain property are the most productive.121  In his view, a system 
dependent on forced labor could never be as economically productive 
as one based on free labor.  This view not only spread to other 
economists, but also strongly influenced British politicians who now 
had an answer to the economic arguments espoused by slave traders.122 
Animal agriculture is at a very similar stage now.  Traditionally, 
family farms in the U.S. have been cottage industries, independent 
operations free of government regulations.  The Jeffersonian ideal held 
that “to preserve democracy, we must maintain the predominance of 
the small landowning farmer,”123 which helped to insulate them from 
the regulations encountered by other businesses.   As farms 
consolidated and became industrialized, this agricultural “exemption” 
from regulation was used to prevent significant government intrusion.  
Moreover, economic independence forms the chief argument against 
animal welfare regulation. 
Third, apologists for child labor argued that children were 
actually better off working in factories, even in horrible conditions, 
                                                 
 118  Kirby, supra note 2, at 96 (quoting CHARLES WING, EVILS OF THE FACTORY 
SYSTEM EXPOSED 17 (1836)). 
 119  Hochschild, supra note 9, at 7. 
 120  Id. at 14 (quoting AN AFRICAN MERCHANT, A TREATISE UPON THE TRADE 
FROM GREAT BRITAIN TO AFRICA, HUMBLY RECOMMENDED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE 
GOVERNMENT (1772)). 
 121  LEO D’ANJOU, SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE: THE FIRST 
ABOLITION CAMPAIGN REVISITED 99 (1996). 
 122  Id. at 99–100. 
 123   J. I. Falconer, Farming and Democracy, 63 POL. SCI. Q. 629 (1948). 
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rather than living in the street or in abject poverty.  They touted the 
increase in family income and the fact that the child had a place to sleep 
and food to eat.124  The Parliamentary hearings on the Factory Acts 
were replete with industry witnesses who testified about the healthy 
living conditions for children in the factories, despite widespread 
knowledge to the contrary.125  Historically, the public feared the 
idleness, more than over-work, of children because it could lead to 
crime and the failure to be adequately prepared for the labor market.126  
Similarly, slavery advocates argued that many Africans enjoyed better 
living conditions working on sugar plantations in America than they 
would face at home.127 
These arguments are echoed in industrial agriculture’s position 
that animals are better off in state-of-the-art confinement facilities, 
environmentally controlled, with access to food and water whenever 
they want it.128  The United Egg Producers claims that hens raised in 
cages "typically have fewer diseases" and that cages "provide for better 
overall bird health and welfare."129  "Modern cage systems," the UEP 
states, "allow hens to stand comfortable (sic), turn around, lie down, 
groom and stretch their wings."130  Incredibly, the UEP guidelines on 
                                                 
 124   Sessional Papers, supra note 71, at 31 (arguing that parents of “lower 
classes” have less affection for their children than upper classes and find it harder to 
care for children, especially if they are sick). 
 125   Id. at 6 (manager of cotton factory testifying that health of working 
children under age 10 “very good” despite working 12-hour days), at 10, 15 
(statements regarding children's general welfare), at 30 (doctor's statement regarding 
health of child workers).  In fact, some witnesses testified that many children in ill 
health actually improved by working in the factory.  Id. at 50 (testifying that sickly 
children got better because of good food and more “regular habits” of factory life). 
 126   Matthias Doepke & Fabrizio Zilibotti, The Macroeconomics of Child Labor 
Regulation, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1492 (2005).  See also, Sessional Papers, supra note 71, at 
37 (discussing the fear of “idleness” if children were not employed and its effect on 
family finances).  
 127   Hochschild, supra note 9, at 140 (slave ship owners claimed that the most 
crowded slave ships were the most healthy and that the voyage to the colonies was 
“the happiest part of a negro’s life”). 
 128   Scully, supra note 109, at 258-259.  See generally National Pork Board, Sow 
Housing, http://www.pork.org/Resources/977/SowHousing.aspx (last visited Nov. 
22, 2010) (stating the advantages of confinement housing for sows). 
 129   United Egg Producers, Modern Cage Production, http://www.uepcertified. 
com/program/quality-safety/categories/cage-prod (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) 
(regarding housing for chickens and how these types of cages are best for the birds).   
 130   Id.  
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which these claims are based require cages to provide only 67 to 88 
square inches of cage space per bird.131  A standard piece of copy paper, 
by comparison, has 93.5 square inches of space.  The National Pork 
Producers Council, similarly, argues that gestation crates actually 
benefit the pregnant sows by protecting them from "aggression and 
competition" and the "detrimental effects associated with 
environmental extremes."132  On the other hand, some of the most 
powerful arguments for better animal treatment are based not on the 
welfare of the animal, but on the argument that improved 
environmental conditions result in better-quality meat.133 
Thus, the industrialized agricultural revolution has undergone a 
stage of competitive deterioration, driven by market forces, similar to 
conditions resulting in the abuse of child laborers during the Industrial 
Revolution.  While free market rhetoric sustained the deplorable 
institution of child labor for many years during the 1800s, pressure to 
reform increased until effective legislation was eventually enacted.  By 
studying this next stage, we can discern similar currents of reform in 
the animal welfare situation today. 
B.   Pressure to Reform 
 
The central question of this paper is how society moves from the 
stage of unfettered capitalism to the advent of government regulation, 
given the powerless political position of the reform's beneficiaries.  The 
history of child labor reform suggests that the development of a new 
ethical imperative is the primary spur to action.  How such ethical 
change occurs is, of course, the subject of much scholarly debate.  The 
child labor history points to key ingredients such as the influence of 
popular culture, the leadership of key figures, and the occurrence of 
                                                 
 131   United Egg Producers, Key UEP Animal Husbandry Guidelines, 
http://www.uepcertified.com/program/guidelines/categories/housing-space-feed-
water (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 132   National Pork Producers Council, Sow Housing, http://www.nppc.org/ 
issues/sowhousing.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 133   See, e.g., D. Álvarez, M.D. Garrido, S. Bañón, Influence of Pre-Slaughter 
Process on Pork Quality: An Overview, 25 FOOD REVIEWS INT'L 233, 244 (2009) ("There is 
no doubt that poor environmental conditions during pre-slaughter handling . . . can 
irreversibly affect the quality of the meat.").  See also Sam Millet, Performance, meat and 
carcass traits of fattening pigs with organic versus conventional housing and nutrition, 87 
LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION SCIENCE 109 (May 2004). 
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triggering events.  Even when public opinion shifts, however, reform 
requires the formation of a permanent structure, in the form of interest 
groups, to leverage this sentiment and sustain political action.  Finally, 
economic interests may align, at least temporarily, with the ideological 
interests to provide sufficient political power to achieve regulatory 
outcomes.   
Because protection of the powerless requires this “perfect storm” 
of societal developments, it is not surprising that regulation is slow, 
often lagging significantly behind public opinion.  As the next section 
details, Britain began to take legislative action on child labor in 1802, 
but as late as 1874, eight-year-old children were still permitted to work 
half-time in factories. Chimney sweep apprentices received protection 
only in 1875, after a century of public agitation over their treatment.134  
As Alan Watson noted, the law is constantly out of phase with society’s 
desires, which he attributed primarily to the forces of inertia.135  Nor is 
it surprising that regulations to protect the powerless, once enacted, 
become difficult to enforce, or start to erode with exceptions, as the 
coalition of interest groups that supported reform begins to fragment or 
fade, unless a new norm has been firmly established.   
This section examines the elements needed to produce effective 
regulation for the powerless. 
1. Ethical development 
Although many laws are based on morality, ideological bases are 
often perceived to be window-dressing for the economic interests truly 
at stake.  With respect to protection for the powerless, however, the 
absence of an economic impetus makes the development of a new ethic 
the only (or at least the most important) driver of change.  Ethical 
change appears to arise when there is a heightened public awareness of 
immoral conditions, often through popular culture, combined with the 
development of theory and language by the prominent shapers of 
public opinion to provide the movement with legitimacy.     
                                                 
 134   Kirby, supra note 2, at 94. 
 135   Alan Watson, SOCIETY AND LEGAL CHANGE 8 (1977).  Sociologists refer to 
this delay as “cultural lag.”  William F. Ogburn, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO 
CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE 200 (1950).  On the other hand, much of this lag can 
be legitimate time for study of a problem and investigation of suitable solutions.  
Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents, 67 COLUM.  L. REV. 76 (1967). 
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The process by which new norms arise in a complex social 
system occupies a vast space in sociological literature.136  New social 
movement theory recognizes that there is a "framing" process, during 
which a collective interpretation emerges from individual stories and 
encounters.137  Palma Strand has explored how the community's shared 
story then interacts with the accepted, formalized "legal story" that 
emanates from courts and legislatures in a continuous cycle of 
modification.138   
Thus far, the collective story regarding factory farming is 
dominated by lingering perceptions of farmers who "care about their 
animals" and laissez-faire economic policy.  Producers articulate their 
story through advertising, web sites, and even YouTube videos that 
tout the sanitary, healthy conditions for animals and the high quality of 
the resulting product.  The courts reinforce this story by employing 
standing limitations, which preclude anyone from challenging 
industrial farming conditions.  Legislatures confirm the story by 
exempting agricultural animals from cruelty laws.  The emergence of a 
new norm may depend on "multiple individual experiences and stories 
about those experiences" which begin to alter the accepted collective 
understanding of the situation.139   
One example of this process is the response to a news story 
posted on the internet about 11,000 hogs killed in a confinement 
operation fire.140  The news story itself gives us the "accepted" frame for 
this story; the main concerns seem to be human - how much property 
the owner lost, whether the farm's employees will keep their jobs, and 
how potentially hazardous material will be disposed of.  On the other 
hand, numerous comments to the story posted by others attempt to 
change the focus of the story to the suffering of the animals.  One by 
"Old Way Farmer" provides a good example, lamenting that modern 
corporate confinements are worse than prisons and create conditions 
that make disasters like this more likely.141  Unlike the old days, Old 
                                                 
 136  See generally Sawyer, supra note 56. 
 137   Id. at 210-11.  See also Babcock, supra note 44, at 143; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996). 
 138  Strand, supra note 55, at 620-24. 
 139  Id. at 621 (diagram). 
 140  WGEM, Estimated 11K pigs killed in hog confinement fire, Apr. 22, 2009, 
http://www.wgem.com/global/story.asp?s=10233491. 
 141  The comment of Old Way Farmer in full (typographical errors in 
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Way Farmer complains, "poor hogs are doomed to live their lives in 
buildings and never have the enjoyment of rooting around in a mud 
bog."  Mothers (the sows), the post continues, "are confined in a bathtub 
                                                                                                                                
 
I spotted the heavy smoke rise from this fire as if a bomb exploded. 
I was near the scene watching the fire and it brought tears to my 
eyes. Not from the smoke, but from the thought of all those poor 
pigs traped inside. We raised hogs on our farm for many years and 
they were never confined. Most of our neighbors also raised hogs. 
You could travel around the area and see the hogs resting in their 
huts or out milling around in lots and pastures. I don`t ever recall 
a time when our hogs were sick or in some sort of danger. When 
the BIG corperations decided to take over the hog business, it put 
the small farmers out of the hog business. Now the poor hogs are 
doomed to live their lives in buildings and never have the 
enjoyment of rooting around in a mud bog. With so many hogs 
confined in such close quarters, not only are they mistreated, (In 
prison) they are not even given 24 hour care. Why aren`t there 
large sprinkler systems in these hog confinments? Why aren`t 
there personal attendents on duty 24 hours a day? What, no smoke 
alarms? Maybe escape hatches should be available so hogs could 
be let out in case of a fire? Even hardned criminals in prisons get to 
come out of their cells each day to excercise. I`m sure all prisons 
have smoke alarms and sprinkler systems also. Why should 
animals not have the same kindness. After all, they didn`t do 
anything wrong! It breaks my heart when I see livestock treated 
worse then vegetables. Hmmm? Even tomatoes are handled with 
care! Think about it! As soon as your baby is born, put it in a small 
crib with a dozen other babies and leave it there until it is a 
toddler. Then move it to a small cell with 2 dozen other toddlers. 
You never get to hold your baby, touch your baby, play with your 
baby or watch your baby grow. Your baby never gets to enjoy life. 
It just gets to eat until it is ready to be loaded into a truck headed 
for market. Oh yes, did I forget to mention that you the Mother are 
also confined to an even worse fate. You are confined in a bathtub 
for your life. (The size of the crate the sow lives in) Never to move 
around or even turn. Just stand or lie down. I don`t usually talk 
out against things like this, but I am very upset that nobody was 
on duty at the time of the fire. This is not right! Would a prison be 
left alone all night with all the prisoners locked up in their cells? I 
think more rules need to be laid out for these hog prisons! I guess 
I’m just upset that these poor hogs never had a chance to get out of 
the burning building or enjoy life! Sorry for the long read. 
 
Id. 
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for … life.  Never to move around or even turn.  Just stand or lie 
down."142  The combined effect of farmers or others expressing this 
revulsion may eventually result in the collective emergence of a new 
"frame" for this type of story, which in turn will impact the way the law 
approaches the issue.143 
The development of a new ethic toward child labor required a 
combination of several important elements.  New social movement 
theorists point to the development of "symbolic" resources - in other 
words, the language and arguments that resonate with society and link 
the argument to the society's storehouse of previously accepted ideas.144  
Child labor reformers, for example, had to develop arguments to 
counter the laissez-faire philosophy relied upon by factory owners, 
which preached that private enterprise must remain unfettered by 
government regulation.  There was a sense that “universal unrestricted 
competition” was absolutely necessary for the economy to function, 
“from which it was regarded as little short of immoral to depart.”145   
In response, progressive theorists had to create a language and 
philosophy to justify government intervention.  Prominent thinkers 
recognized that capitalism, completely unchecked, could lead to 
abuses, necessitating societal control.  In one of the first scholarly 
treatments of the Industrial Revolution, Arnold Toynbee remarked: 
“Competition, we have now learnt, is neither good nor evil in itself; it is 
a force which has to be studied and controlled; it may be compared to a 
stream whose strength and direction have to be observed, that 
embankments may be thrown up within which it may do its work 
harmlessly and beneficially.”146  By recognizing that pure capitalism 
could be as destructive as pure socialism, these scholars provided the 
                                                 
 142  Id. 
 143  Professor Strand provides fruitful examples of how social change occurs 
through this process in areas such as gay rights, gun control and abortion.  Palma Joy 
Strand, Harvey Milk, Jane Roe, and James Brady: A Civic Perspective on Gay Rights, 
Abortion, and Gun Control, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1719763 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).  The biggest obstacle to this process is 
the exclusion of alternative stories from the modern jurisprudential process.  Strand, 
supra note 55, at 628-30.  The internet, however, is much more inclusive and therefore 
may help evade this obstacle to change. 
 144   Hope Babcock also identifies the importance of constructing "linkages" to 
norms that are more established.  Babcock, supra note 44, at 144. 
 145  Toynbee, supra note 79, at 87. 
 146  Id.  
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forces of morality with the rhetorical ammunition they needed to 
achieve legislative progress. 
Similarly, animal welfare theory is beginning to gain critical 
mass among progressive scholars, who provide the language and 
arguments for public discourse.  Discussion of reform has become so 
well-accepted in academic circles that animal rights courses are now 
offered at about 100 American law schools and an increasing number of 
established scholars are contributing significant research to the 
subject.147  Animal welfare theorists have begun to establish better 
linkages between the desired animal welfare norms and more 
established normative concepts that resonate with public opinion.  
While agricultural producers rely on slogans such as "free market" and 
"foreign competition" that call forth accepted, persuasive concepts in 
the public's storehouse of symbolic resources, animal welfare advocates 
counter with “stewardship” language, sometimes linking those 
concepts with accepted religious norms.148  The stewardship norm 
seems to resonate more successfully than rhetoric based on “rights” for 
animals, which many people may find threatening and inconsistent 
with their accepted view of animal-human relationships.149 
In order to be more successful, animal welfare groups need to 
make further links with established social norms that make the animal 
welfare norm more acceptable.150  For example, accepted norms against 
cruelty to companion animals can be called upon to make regulation of 
food animals more persuasive.  Eventually, reformers may be able to 
make the link between the plight of animals in the industrialized 
agricultural revolution with the plight of other powerless groups, such 
                                                 
 147  Animal Legal Defense Fund, Animal Law Courses, 
http://aldf.org/userdata_display.php?modin=51 (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).  See also 
Jeff Welty, Forward: Animal Law: Thinking About the Future, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
1, 1-2 (2007) (discussing "remarkable growth" of animal law at American law schools). 
 148  See, e.g., Scully, supra note 109, at v-vi (contents).  A glance at the table of 
contents of Matthew Scully’s influential book on animal welfare shows that it is 
saturated with religious references.  
 149  See, e.g., JAMES P. STERBA, THREE CHALLENGES TO ETHICS: 
ENVIRONMENTALISM, FEMINISM, AND MULTICULTURALISM 27-49 (2001).  Sterba argues 
that the positions of animal activists such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan do not 
account for the positive aspects of species partiality.  Instead, he argues for a 
“biocentric” view that would allow the needs of other species to be ignored only 
when necessary to fulfill basic human needs.    
 150  See also Strand, supra note 55, at 628-30 (discussing how system works to 
marginalize and denigrate stories that challenge dominant principles and standards). 
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as slaves and children, to utilize the symbolic resources those now-
established norms provide.      
Social change theorists also point to individuals, both politicians 
and civilians, who provide the leadership necessary to carry the ethical 
issue forward and give it legitimacy.  Howard Becker coined the term 
"moral entrepreneur" for those who seek to convince others to adopt a 
new norm and Cass Sunstein noted the importance of such leaders in 
discussing how society adopts a new norm.151  Although moral 
entrepreneurs outside the political system can be instrumental (think 
Martin Luther King, Jr.), the adoption of a moral cause by a political 
leader can be a crucial moment in the process of norm adoption.  
Although public choice theory emphasizes the dominant influence of 
economic interest groups in politics, government leaders do sometimes 
decide to act on behalf of the less powerful.152  Civic republicans would 
certainly emphasize the role of such leaders, who can help lead a 
dialogue "to make the citizenry more virtuous by changing individual 
preferences."153 
In the child labor area, civic-minded leaders such as Sir Robert 
Peel, Sr. and Robert Owen were clearly instrumental in spurring public 
scrutiny and shaping public opinion.  Peel's 1802 bill governing the 
employment of apprentices in the cotton industry was derided as 
radical by industrialists and political economists alike, who were sure it 
would cause the ruin of British manufacturers.154  Despite these 
objections, Peel pushed the bill forward.  Although the 1802 Act was 
limited in scope and ultimately proved ineffective, it broke the ground 
for legislative control of industry.  Similarly, in the early 1800s, British 
factory owner Robert Owen publicized the evils of the new industrial 
society and illustrated practically how goods could be manufactured 
while treating workers humanely.155  His influence led to the Factory 
                                                 
 151  Howard S. Becker, Moral Entrepreneurs: The Creation and Enforcement of 
Deviant Categories, in NANCY J. HERMAN, DEVIANCE: A SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST 
APPROACH 169 (1995).   See also Sunstein, supra note 137, at 909.  
 152  KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN AND JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 402 (1986) ("At various times and under various 
circumstances, various governmental institutions and actors have adopted the causes 
of the less advantaged and broad publics."). 
 153  Farber & Frickey, supra note 17, at 44 (discussing civic republicanism). 
 154  Willoughby, supra note 65, at 18.   
 155  G.D.H. COLE, THE LIFE OF ROBERT OWEN (2nd ed. 1930). 
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Act of 1819,156 which continued the long, slow drive toward reform.  
Thus, significant changes in public opinion can be catalyzed by 
prominent political figures and moral entrepreneurs who legitimize 
and popularize the ideas behind reform. 
One shortcoming of the animal welfare reform effort thus far is 
the failure to attract "norm leaders" of sufficient stature to signal the 
legitimacy of the new norm.157  The antics of PETA158 and the eco-terror 
activities of other animal rights groups159 may have made it easier for 
the broader public to dismiss animal welfare stories as "fringe" or 
illegitimate and unworthy of consideration.  While racy pictures of 
Pamela Anderson may generate publicity, they may at the same time 
detract from the credibility of the message and encourage mainstream 
political leaders to keep their distance.  On the other hand, the writings 
of prominent legal scholars that make or rely on animal welfare 
arguments do the work of moral entrepreneurs in signaling legitimacy.   
In the development of a new ethical imperative, the influence of 
popular culture cannot be overestimated.160  In many cases, popular 
books have been influential in starting revolutions in public opinion 
followed by dramatic changes in the law.  With regard to child labor, 
Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist (1838) was enormously popular and 
greatly increased the public’s awareness of the conditions of the 
workhouse, while Hard Times (1854) painted a dark portrait of the 
                                                 
 156 Checkland, supra note 66, at 246. 
 157  Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887, 901 (1998). 
 158  CBC/Radio-Canada, Pam Anderson PETA permit nixed by Montreal, July 15, 
2007, www.cbc.ca/arts/media/story/2010/07/15/montreal-pam-anderson-adveget 
arian.html (Montreal denied PETA permit for event launching campaign featuring 
risqué advertisement of Pam Anderson).  Many comments to the story indicate that, 
while the event generated publicity, it did not add to the credibility of the 
organization.  
 159  See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, Eco-Terror Indictments: 'Operation 
Backfire' Nets 11, Jan. 20, 2006, www2.fbi.gov/page2/jan06/elf012006.htm (65-count 
indictment alleges involvement in 17 attacks, including arson at Vail Ski Resort and 
sabotage of power line in Oregon). 
 160  ROBERT H. WALKER, THE REFORM SPIRIT IN AMERICA 303 (1976) (asserting 
that, though “very seldom do works of literature produce important tangible results, . 
. . every major reform campaign has benefited importantly from the contributions of 
creative artists"). 
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Industrial Revolution.161  American Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin (1852), of course, inspired and bolstered the abolition 
movement by its vivid depiction of the conditions of slavery.  The book 
aroused popular sentiment that helped to justify the Civil War and the 
ultimate abolition of slavery.  Similarly, The Jungle (1906), by Upton 
Sinclair, which exposed the treatment of workers and the unsafe, 
unsanitary conditions of American meat-packing plants, led to 
unprecedented government regulation of industry, in the Meat 
Inspection Act and in the Pure Food and Drug Act.162  John Steinbeck's 
The Grapes of Wrath (1939) publicized the plight of migrant workers, 
while Rachel Carson’s bestseller describing the dangers of pesticides, 
Silent Spring (1962), is credited with helping to launch a generation of 
environmental regulation.   
In the animal welfare context, many nonfiction books have 
influenced public opinion significantly, adding to public awareness of 
the issue and developing the language necessary for norm acceptance.  
Early on, Albert Schweitzer proposed a new ethic toward animals, 
arguing that “only a universal ethics which obliges us to be occupied 
with all beings puts us in a complete relation with the universe and the 
will manifested in it.”163  As an accepted "moral entrepreneur" of 
enormous stature, Schweitzer's argument should have been influential.  
Yet, when Peter Singer published Animal Liberation in 1975, his 
argument for greater rights for animals was a lonely voice.  A decade 
later, Tom Regan presented a coherent philosophical approach 
supporting a new moral stance toward animals, in The Case for Animal 
Rights, which provided much of the language and legitimacy the 
movement needed.  Nevertheless, because these books took what many 
considered to be "radical" positions regarding our relationship with 
animals, popular opinion still marginalized, to a large extent, those 
clamoring for reform.   
                                                 
 161  Indeed, Dickens wrote articles on the horrors of child labor that appeared 
alongside the serial version of Hard Times.  Charles Dickens, Ground in the Mill, 
HOUSEHOLD WORDS Apr. 22, 1854, at 224-27. 
 162   Of course, the legislation was aimed at providing safe consumer products 
rather than improving the plight of the workers or animals.  See Federal Meat 
Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C.A. § 601 (2008); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C.A. § 301 (2009). 
 163  Albert Schweitzer, The Evolution of Ethics, 202 ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 
1958, at 73. 
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Matthew Scully’s book, Dominion: The Power of Man, the 
Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy, which appeared in 2002, 
was significant not only in its detailed and disturbing account of the 
abusive conditions endured by animals in industrialized agriculture, 
but also in the moral case it made for better treatment.  The fact that 
Scully emerged from the ranks of the conservative establishment, 
having served as a speechwriter for President George W. Bush, gave his 
argument influence with a societal group previously not disposed to 
favor farm regulation.164  By emphasizing welfare concerns, the book 
seemed to make the ethical case less radical and more accessible to a 
greater segment of the public. 
While these books, among many others,165 have provided the 
animal welfare reform movement with legitimacy, language and 
arguments, the reform effort has yet to produce a broadly-influential 
work of popular fiction, like Oliver Twist or Uncle Tom's Cabin.  
Interestingly, factory farm opponents continue to rely on The Jungle, 
noting that conditions in meat-packing plants have not changed 
significantly since its publication over a century ago, which illustrates 
the power of a fictional narrative in shaping public opinion.  However, 
modern platforms for social interaction, including Facebook and 
Youtube, have been used effectively by animal welfare groups,166 and 
may replace or at least supplement, the role of literature in forming 
new ethical norms.   Moreover, films such as Food, Inc.,167 can be 
enormously effective in creating a "critical mass," defined as "a 
                                                 
 164   Similarly, economist Adam Smith's stance against slavery as ultimately 
less efficient than free labor helped to blunt laissez faire arguments against abolition.  
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 80 (Penguin 1986) (1776). 
 165   See, e.g, JONATHAN SAFRON FOER, EATING ANIMALS (2009); GENE BAUR, 
FARM SANCTUARY: CHANGING HEARTS AND MINDS ABOUT ANIMALS AND FOOD (2008). 
 166  See, e.g., Compassion Over Killing, Help for the Hopeless, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q10hx8nS5DA (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) 
(describing abuse in the chicken industry); Animal Aid, Undercover Investigation at 
Intensive Pig Farm, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YIkxc37gwXo&feature 
=related (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (describing abuse at hog confinement).  Of course, 
producers have responded with their own postings attempting to show animals kept 
in better conditions.  See, e.g., Familyfarmer, The Truth about Modern Pork Production on 
Family Farms, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cy_0zsAkbg8 (last visited Nov. 
22, 2010) ("Learn from a mother and farmer how the environment & livestock are 
cared for today in modern barns.  Farmers care for their animals today just like 
farmers did generations ago. Farmers know healthy animals produce healthy food."). 
 167  FOOD, INC. (Robert Kenner 2009). 
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sufficient number of people who agree with the new norm to create an 
impression of broad-based adoption."168  
2. Formation of interest groups: structure for public pressure 
Ideological concern may be insufficient to drive reform without 
an organizational context.169  Organizations provide a platform and 
means to transform deeply held beliefs into action.  Moreover, 
organizations can provide a structure for constant political pressure 
and oversight that even committed individuals cannot emulate.  
Organizations allow the pursuit of reform goals over long periods of 
time, between peaks of public interest and involvement, and allow the 
movement to take advantage quickly of new opportunities for 
mobilization.170  As one social scientist explained: 
Bureaucratic organization helps a group with the problem of 
pattern maintenance.  By creating a structure of roles with 
defined expectations in the place of diffuse commitments, a 
challenging group can better assure that certain tasks will be 
routinely performed.  It gives the challenging group a higher 
readiness for action.171 
 
Although fully exploring the nuances of interest group theory is 
beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that the formation of an issue 
organization can be a significant development in a social reform 
movement’s history.172 
                                                 
 168   Babcock, supra note 44, at 143 (citing Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 157, 
at 901). 
 169 Rubin, supra note 5, at 28-30 (discussing the importance of organizational 
structures in reform movements). 
 170  David S. Meyer, Introduction: Social Movements and Public Policy: Eggs, 
Chicken and Theory, in ROUTING THE OPPOSITION: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, PUBLIC POLICY 
AND DEMOCRACY 1, 9-10 (2004).  
 171  WILLIAM A. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST 91 (1975).  See also 
Walker, supra note 160, at 426 ("[T]he success or failure of a reform movement 
depends on the existence of sustained, organized effort. . . .  Reform may have its 
moments of high art and high drama; but its progress depends on such unglamorous 
daily activities as going to press, selling pamphlets, organizing chapters, raising 
money, and getting out the vote."). 
 172  See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1998); Frank R. 
Baumgartner & Christine Mahoney, Social Movements and the Rise of New Issues, in 
ROUTING THE OPPOSITION, supra note 170, at 65. 
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  In the United States, at least, social organizations to support 
animal welfare existed before organizations to prevent child labor.  For 
example, in New York City the American Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals was founded in 1866, while the New York Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, said to be the first child 
protection organization anywhere, came into existence about 10 years 
later.173  In the child labor reform effort, religious organizations 
provided important structural support.174  Similarly, in the slavery 
context, religions institutions (notably the Quakers) gave vital 
organizational structure to the abolition movement, which historians 
believe was crucial to its success.175 
When workers organized and unions began serious agitation in 
the mid-1800s,176 their support also was critical to the success of child 
labor reform.  In fact, the larger context of labor reform provided fertile 
ground for effective child labor restrictions because it furthered the idea 
that employers did not have carte blanche concerning the conditions of 
employment.  The history of child labor reform therefore illustrates the 
need to stitch together the support of groups with a variety of interests 
who may support a particular reform based on diverse motives. 
Many American organizations now support animal welfare 
reform, including People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals,177 the 
Humane Society of the United States,178 Farm Sanctuary,179 Compassion 
Over Killing,180 and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
                                                 
 173  American Soc. for the Prev’n of Cruelty to Animals, History, 
www.aspca.org/about-us/history.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010); New York Soc. for 
the Prev’n of Cruelty to Children, History, www.nyspcc.org/nyspcc/history/ (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 174   Kirby, supra note 2, at 97-98. 
 175   Hochschild, supra note 9, at 213. 
 176  Checkland, supra note 66, at 372 (detailing reforms in the 1860s and 
1870s).  Not until 1880, for example, with the Employers Liability Act, was the first 
attempt made to transfer the risk of accident on the job to the employer rather than 
the worker.  Id. at 374. 
 177   People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, About PETA, 
http://www.peta.org/about/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 178   Humane Society of the United States, About us, http://www. 
humanesociety.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 179   Farm Sanctuary, About us, http://www.farmsanctuary.org/about/ (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
 180  Compassion Over Killing, About, http://www.cok.net/about (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010). 
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Animals.181  Although the proliferation of such groups indicates an 
increasing level of public support in general for animal protection 
goals, the sheer number of groups raises the question of whether they 
are too fragmented to provide sufficient political power for major 
reform. 182  Other groups, such as the Sierra Club and the Humane 
Farming Association, also oppose industrial farming but may have 
different agendas.  For example, the Sierra Club may be most interested 
in factory farm control from a pollution-control perspective, while 
certain farm groups may focus on the impact of corporate agriculture 
on small farmers.  The division between animal rights and animal 
welfare principles also weakens the overall reform effort.  Some animal 
rights activists, for example, believe that animal welfare reform may 
actually undermine their agenda, by making exploitation of animals 
more palatable to the general public.183   Thus, these two groups, which 
seem to have much to gain by cooperation, may not be able to find 
enough common ground to achieve their goals.  Social movement 
scholars note that cooperation among such groups may wax and wane 
as circumstances and resources change.184  Success may depend on 
cobbling together sufficient interest groups with common interests to 
achieve critical mass.  
3. Triggering events 
 Much as an earthquake releases stored-up pressure and adjusts 
the relationship between tectonic plates, triggering events are catalysts 
for dramatic shifts in public policy.   Significant changes in the law can 
often be traced to dramatic occurrences that coalesce public sentiment.  
In the United States, disasters often lead to major environmental 
legislation: the Cuyahoga River fire in 1969 helped inspire Congress to 
enact the federal Clean Water Act in 1972; the discovery of toxic waste 
in Love Canal and Times Beach in the late 1970s led to the federal 
                                                 
 181  Soc. for the Prev’n of Cruelty to Animals International, About Us, 
http://www.spcai.org/about-us.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 182  See Welty, supra note 147, at 3 (discussing divisions among animal law 
advocates). 
 183  Gary L. Francione, supra note 12, at 10-11 (noting animal welfare agenda 
may actually undermine animal rights agenda by making exploitation more 
palatable). 
 184  Meyer, Jenness & Ingram, supra note 170, at 9 (stating that, ironically, 
cooperation tends to be highest when more public attention is paid to an issue, so 
coalition dynamics tend to follow and accentuate the dynamics of a protest cycle). 
Anderson Stanford Journal of Animal Law & Policy | Vol. 4  
(2011) 
 
 45 
hazardous waste cleanup system; and the Bhopal Union Carbide 
explosion in 1984 directly resulted in legislation regarding emergency 
planning for toxic disasters.185  The 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill 
triggered the 1990 Oil Pollution Act186 and the recent BP oil disaster in 
the Gulf of Mexico has focused Congress's attention once again on the 
subject. 
 Political scientists define "triggering events" as "those immediate 
factors in the political setting which provide the link between demands 
for action and public policy."187  Although the term is sometimes 
defined broadly to include interest group activities and election year 
politics, clearly a catastrophic event or sensational court case is a 
powerful trigger that can quickly catalyze government action.188  In the 
labor area, the most prominent example was the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Factory fire in 1911, which killed 146 employees, mostly young girls, 
and brought the deplorable working conditions of immigrants in the 
garment district into the public view.  “The tragedy focused attention 
upon the ghastly factories in which most immigrants worked”189 and 
served as a wake-up call to the public: “For the first time in the history 
of New York’s garment industry there were indications that the public 
was beginning to accept responsibility for the exploitation of the 
immigrants.”190  
A problem like the abuse of immigrant laborers can easily be 
hidden away from public consciousness until a tragedy like the 
Triangle Shirtwaist fire occurs.  Because almost all industrialized 
agriculture takes place in closed, windowless buildings, with strictly 
limited public access, most people have only a vague idea of where 
their meat comes from.  In the animal welfare context, there has not 
                                                 
 185  See Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-five, 26 
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 414 (1995). 
 186  Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§2710-62.  See William H. Rodgers, 
Jr., 2 ENVTL. L. (West) §4:37A (noting Exxon Valdez spill has been called the "Pearl 
Harbor" of environmental improvement). 
 187  Edmund F. McGarrell & Thomas C. Castellano, Social Structure, Crime, and 
Politics: A Conflict Model of the Criminal Law Formation Process, in MAKING LAW: THE 
STATE, THE LAW, AND STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS, supra note 17, at 347, 361. 
 188   Id. at 353. 
 189  Bonnie Mitelman, Rose Schneiderman and the Triangle Fire, 16 AM. HIST. 
ILLUS. 38, 41 (1981). 
 190   Id. at 45.  See also JOSEPH G. RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 263 
(1959) (noting safety and health regulations were revised and enforcement was 
bolstered as a result of the Triangle disaster). 
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been a similar “triggering event” to capture the attention of the public.  
There have been confinement operation catastrophes, in which 
hundreds or even thousands of animals have been killed; in one 
disaster in Illinois, noted above, 11,000 hogs were incinerated.191  
Because the animals are confined in large numbers, with sometimes 
sporadic supervision, the potential for large-scale destruction is greater 
than in traditional farming operations.  Nevertheless, these tragedies 
caused hardly a ripple of public concern, despite the fact that they 
resulted from an industrial form of animal confinement in which 
human contact is largely absent.  Perhaps because the animals were 
soon to be killed anyway, their deaths did not trigger as much outrage.    
Another type of triggering event in industrialized agriculture is 
the "exposé" video, which shows the public graphic images of what 
goes on behind the closed doors of confinement operations.192  The 
mainstream media has sometimes given these undercover videos 
significant attention.193  Thus far, however, the videos have been 
insufficient to trigger legislative action. 
In August 2010, a potential triggering event occurred when half 
a billion eggs were recalled due to salmonella contamination that 
resulted in over 1600 illnesses.194  For several weeks, the public’s 
attention was focused on egg-production methods, which most people 
had presumably never given much thought to before.  However, 
because the event involved human health concerns, much of the 
resulting pressure for reform arose not from the altruistic motives of 
animal welfare protection but rather from self-interest, and Congress 
focused on the need to enact further human safety legislation rather 
                                                 
 191  WGEM, supra note 140.  See also Mark Geary, Crews Battle Fire at Hog 
Confinement Building, KCRG-TV9, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.kcrg.com/news/ 
local/17668804.html.  
 192  Mercy for Animals has gone undercover and posted many of these videos 
on its website.  Mercy for Animals, http://www.mercyforanimals.org (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010). 
 193  See, e.g., Julia Preston, Kosher Plant Is Accused of Inhumane Slaughter, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/ 
05/us/05immig.html?_r=1&ref=agriprocessors_inc (reporting on PETA undercover 
video showing slaughter methods at Agriprocessors' plant).  
 194  Mary Claire Jalonick, Egg Company Chiefs Give Congress Few Answers, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2010, available at http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/ 
us_tainted_eggs. 
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than welfare regulation.195  In that regard, the public reaction is very 
similar to the response to Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle in the early 1900s; 
despite the book’s powerful depiction of exploited workers and abused 
animals, to Sinclair’s dismay the public focused on the possibility of 
contaminated food, resulting in Congress enacting the Food Inspection 
Act rather than protecting animals or workers. 
Thus, it is difficult to imagine what kind of event would provide 
the sudden impetus often required to bring reform efforts to fruition.  
The absence of a triggering event, however, may not be fatal to reform 
efforts.  Child labor reform cannot be traced to one major event that 
captured and focused public attention.  Instead, success was due to the 
steady accumulation of the sources of material and symbolic power.  
The videos and confinement disasters noted above contribute to the 
overall process of norm development necessary to achieve reform, and 
events such as the salmonella outbreak should at least raise public 
awareness of significant concerns with the industrialized agriculture 
model. 
4. Economics 
Historians emphasize that economic factors as much as moral 
concerns led to the legislative restrictions on child labor.  Although 
many families depended economically on their children’s employment, 
during periodic downturns in the economy unions naturally supported 
limited hours or other child labor regulations to reduce the oversupply 
of labor.196  Economists studying countries that continue to rely 
significantly on child labor stress that the laboring class remains 
ambivalent about reform, even to protect their own children.  A recent 
study concludes that “workers' attitudes regarding [child labor 
regulation] depend not only on the degree to which they compete with 
children in the labor market, but also on the extent to which their 
family income relies on child labor.”197   
 Advances in economic theory were crucial to the success of child 
labor reform in Britain.  Although the free-market theories of Adam 
                                                 
 195   Id. (discussing proposed legislation that would give FDS more power to 
recall tainted products, require more inspections of facilities, and impose stricter 
safety standards). 
 196  W. W. ROSTOW, BRITISH ECONOMY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 118-20 
(1948). 
 197  Doepke & Zilibotti, supra note 126, at 1493. 
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Smith stifled reform attempts early in the Industrial Revolution, 
political economists began to modify their views as they gained more 
experience with the societal impacts of unchecked competition.  One 
historian, William Willoughby, noted this in his 1890 treatise on child 
labor:  “Although every political economist who wrote before 1850 was 
uncompromisingly opposed to this legislation, not one who has written 
since 1865 has ventured to deny the advisability of the Factory acts.”198  
Willoughby himself made the case for regulating child labor in 
economic terms.  He argued that child labor restrictions should result in 
higher wages due to a tighter labor market, thereby reducing the 
impact on family income.  For employers, the cost of increased wages 
would be offset by the increased efficiency of older workers and the 
ability to introduce labor-saving machinery.199  Thus, the argument for 
child labor reform was not purely moral in the end. 
 Appeals to economic self-interest have garnered the necessary 
support for the protection of powerless objects in other contexts.  For 
example, debates over wilderness or endangered species protection 
often reference expected economic benefits of preservation to the area 
from increased tourism.200  Economic arguments played a large role in 
building opposition to slavery as well.  While some Southern 
antebellum political economists defended the economic benefits of a 
system built on “free labor,”201 Adam Smith himself opposed slavery 
on the ground that it produced laborers who were actually less efficient 
and more expensive, due to their lack of economic incentive for hard 
work.202  Moreover, the debate over abolition, even in the North, had to 
address economic concerns alongside moral arguments.203 
                                                 
 198  Willoughby, supra note 65, at 23.   
 199  Id. at 57. 
 200  See supra note 43.  For example, the Florida manatee is a protected species 
that brings in eco-tourism dollars every year to Florida.  See Barry D. Soloman et. al, 
The Florida Manatee and Eco-Tourism: Towards a Safe Minimum Standard, ECOLOGICAL 
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 201  Jay R. Carlander & W. Elliot Brownlee, Antebellum Southern Political 
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interplay between economic and moral concerns about slavery among white 
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 Some animal welfare advocates have attempted to frame their 
argument, at least in part, in economic terms.  Consumer demand for 
cage-free eggs or free-range meat, which can be sold at higher prices, 
helps convince producers of the economic benefits of non-factory 
methods.  Animal welfare advocates may argue that animals raised in 
humane conditions result in a better quality product: “a happy pig is a 
tasty pig.”204  Moreover, if there is adequate disclosure of production 
methods, the free market may provide both a platform for expressing 
welfare concerns and a more acceptable alternative to government 
regulation.205 
 Animal rights advocates, however, tend to believe that a 
vegetarian or vegan lifestyle is the only way to achieve their goals, and 
therefore consider these economic arguments illegitimate.   Steven Wise 
and Tom Regan, leading figures in the animal rights movement, make 
the case almost purely in moral terms.206  When economics are 
acknowledged, it is only by reference to examples such as slavery, 
which provide encouragement that “a powerful and profitable evil can 
be overcome.”207   
 History indicates, however, that the ultimate success of animal 
welfare reform efforts may depend on aligning the moral argument 
with an economic one.  For example, animal welfare restrictions may 
actually help smaller producers, who may find it easier to comply with 
stricter regulations; if so, they may be mobilized to provide crucial 
support.  Even climate change arguments that attempt to reveal the full 
“imbedded” environmental costs of products may help animal reform 
advocates, because making this connection tends to favor locally 
produced products, which not only reduce transportation impacts,208 
but also may be more humanely raised. 
                                                 
 204  Francione, supra note 12, at 15 (noting that animal welfare programs 
sometimes equate humane treatment with better quality product and greater 
efficiency) (citation omitted). 
 205  Leslie & Sunstein, supra note 99, at 124-25.  
 206  See Steven M. Wise, An Argument for the Basic Legal Rights of Farmed 
Animals, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 133 (2008); TOM REGAN, DEFENDING 
ANIMAL RIGHTS (2001). 
 207  Wise, supra note 206, at 137 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 208  RICH PIROG & REBECCA RASMUSSEN, "FOOD, FUEL AND THE FUTURE: 
CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL FOOD, FOOD SAFETY AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE 
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 Nevertheless, undue reliance on economic arguments may 
ultimately blunt the force of the moral argument.  It may indeed be 
economically advantageous, for example, to stuff a million chickens 
into cages in a warehouse than to raise them cage-free, with adequate 
access to natural materials.  Moreover, most consumers – even with 
better information regarding production methods – may be simply 
unwilling to pay more for humanely raised products.209  Yet, the reform 
movement's best argument is that morality must trump economics.210   
If the public believes that reform should be required only if and to the 
extent that it is economically advantageous, significant reform will not 
occur.  The history of child labor and slavery reform teaches that 
economic arguments must be addressed, but cannot supplant the moral 
basis for reform. 
 
 The history of child labor reform indicates that protection for 
powerless groups occurs only when sufficient societal pressure arises to 
overcome entrenched economic interests.  Change occurs through a 
complex mixture of ingredients, the most important of which is the 
development of a new ethical imperative.   The ethical norm, however, 
must be sustained and carried forward by interest group structure.  
Triggering events may provide the final impetus for reform.  Finally, 
reform efforts can be facilitated by aligning economic arguments with 
the moral case, to the extent possible.   
C.   Response to Pressure 
  
When pressure for reform reaches sufficient strength, the next 
stage of response begins.  The focus of this article, and the primary 
response desired by most reformers, is some form of legislative 
regulation.  The next section of the article details the lengthy course of 
domestic legislative reform in the child labor area.  However, equally 
significant reform may occur outside the legislative context, through 
consumer action and impact litigation, which are discussed in 
subsequent sections.  
                                                 
 209  See Patrick DePelsmacker, Liesbeth Driesen & Glenn Rayp, Do Consumers 
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1. Domestic legislation 
Although child labor reform in England began early in 19th 
century, it took almost a century of effort to fully address the problem.  
Sixteen pieces of child labor regulatory legislation, called Factory Acts, 
were enacted between 1802 and 1878; in addition, other acts in the 
public health and education area impacted child labor.  While this 
article will not provide a comprehensive treatment of the child reform 
legislation, a summary of the legislative efforts illustrates the tortuous 
course of reform.  
The extent of child labor abuse in the early Industrial Revolution 
period is reflected in the Factory Act of 1819, which prohibited children 
younger than nine from working in the cotton mills.  The legislation 
also limited younger workers to 12-hour days.  By today’s standards, 
this seems a rather modest limitation, but given common work shifts of 
14 or 16 hours, it was at least a beginning.  Nevertheless, this legislation 
was typical of early attempts at reform: it was limited in scope, applied 
only to the cotton industry, and suffered from an almost total lack of 
enforcement.211  
Historians deem the 1833 Factory Act to be the first significant 
reform, as it extended the nine-year-old age minimum to all textile 
mills, except silk, and limited children under 12 to nine-hour days and 
48-hour weeks.212  Significantly, this legislation also required pre-teen 
children to attend school, which resulted in many firms setting up 
“factory schools” of varying quality.   Again, however, enforcement 
was difficult and regulations were regularly evaded.213 
A decade later, the 1844 Factory Act, applicable to all industries, 
lowered the minimum working age to eight, but also restricted the 
employment of children under 13 to half-days (i.e., 6.5 hours), with the 
other half day spent in school.214  Three decades after that, the 1874 
Factory Act raised the minimum working age to ten, and limited the 
hours of those under 14.  Finally, in 1878, teenage employees from 14 to 
18 were limited to 12-hour days with two hours for meals.  Importantly, 
the Act also provided adequate inspection and enforcement 
provisions.215  Thus, legislative reform came gradually, with progress 
                                                 
 211  Checkland, supra note 66, at 246. 
 212  Nardinelli, supra note 92. 
 213  Willoughby, supra note 65, at 20.   
 214 Id. 
 215  Id. at 22.   
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made only as exceptions and loopholes were closed and the 
enforcement mechanism improved.  When Parliament realized that 
early reforms did not result in economic disaster, as opponents 
predicted, they were more willing to enact further restrictions. 
Animal welfare law is just beginning down a similar road of 
regulatory control.  As in the child labor area, initial legislation may be 
focused narrowly on only the worst abuses, such as the use of gestation 
crates or the size of battery cages. Similar to the early Factory Acts, 
these regulations may suffer from inadequate enforcement mechanisms 
and funding.  Once the principle of government intervention in animal 
care standards is established, however, the path to further reform may 
be smoother.  The child labor history teaches that legislative reform will 
probably be a gradual process of establishing footholds, which slowly 
help to re-adjust the accepted norms. Thus, there is a feedback loop 
between government regulation and norm development.216 
In the United States, another significant characteristic of child 
labor reform was the willingness (or necessity) of state legislatures to 
act long before the federal government did.217  Connecticut and 
Massachusetts passed laws limiting children to ten-hour days in 1842, 
and Pennsylvania enacted a minimum working age of 12, almost a 
century before the federal government took action.218  Between 1880 
and 1910, 36 American states set minimum age restrictions for 
employees;219 in 1907 alone, 16 American states enacted some form of 
child labor restriction.220 In contrast, significant federal action did not 
take place until the New Deal era.221  In 1916, the Keating-Owen Act 
would have regulated most child labor abuses,222 but the Supreme 
Court struck it down (over a powerful dissent by Justice Oliver 
                                                 
 216  Strand, supra note 55, at 620-22 (discussing the cyclical relationship 
between law and culture). 
 217  Some might say “necessity” rather than “willingness,” as states’ rights 
arguments were a major impediment to federal action.  See generally, HUGH D. 
HINDMAN, CHILD LABOR: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 64-65 (2002) (federal action suffered 
from doubts as to its constitutionality).  
 218  Id. 
 219  See Miriam Wasserman, Eliminating Child Labor, 10 REGIONAL REV. 8 
(2000). 
 220  E. Watson Kenyon, Child Labor, 2 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 54, 54 (1907). 
 221   Most significant was the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. 8 (1938)), which prohibited many forms of child labor.  
 222  39 Stat. 685 (1916). 
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Wendell Holmes) as going beyond federal authority under the 
interstate commerce power.223   
In the animal welfare area, states have similarly taken the lead: 
states have now taken action, either by legislation or ballot initiative, to 
ban gestation crates, veal crates, and battery cages.224  The ability of 
individual states to act relatively quickly may help provide other states 
and the federal government with evidence regarding the feasibility of 
reform measures.  Similarly, other countries’ experience with efforts to 
regulate animal welfare will be instructive.225 
2. Consumer action 
 Consumer action may take the form of product boycotts or, more 
mildly, the form of consumer choice of products produced in the 
preferred manner.  Consumer choice is facilitated by the dissemination 
of information regarding targeted goods.226  For example, the law 
requiring country of origin labeling (COOL) for many agricultural 
products allows consumers to exercise a preference for domestic 
products.227 
 In the context of child labor, there seems to be no evidence to 
suggest that consumer choice was a widespread first-stage response to 
the problem, either in Britain or the United States.  Perhaps the 
institutional structure to support consumer choice with information 
and encouragement was not yet in place or perhaps there were no 
alternative choices for these products.  More recently, however, 
                                                 
 223   Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918).  The Supreme Court 
overruled this case in upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act in United States v. 
Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). 
 224  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §1039 (2009) (criminal ban against 
veal calf and sow gestation confinement); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4020 (2009) 
(civil ban against veal calf and sow gestation confinement); OR. REV. STAT. §600.150 
(2007) (restrictive confinement of pigs); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 287.746 (West 2009) 
(battery cages); Assemb. B. 1437, 2009-2010 (Cal. 2010) (battery cages; gestation crates); 
Nancy Perry & Peter Brandt, A Case Study on Cruelty to Farm Animals: Lessons Learned 
From the Hallmark Meat Packing Case, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 117, 118 
(2008) (citing further examples in Arizona and California). 
 225  James Moynagh, EU Regulation and Consumer Demand for Animal Welfare, 3 
J. AGBIOTECH. MGMT. & ECON., 107 (2000) (detailing European regulations regarding 
animal transport, battery cages, and veal calfs, among others), available at 
www.agbioforum.org/v3n23/v3n23a06-moynagh.pdf. 
 226  See generally Leslie & Sunstein, supra note 99. 
 227  19 U.S.C. §1304 (1999). 
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consumer action has been seen as an important, if somewhat 
controversial, remedy for the latter-stage problem of foreign 
competition undermining domestic child labor legislation.228   
 In the case of slavery, however, consumer action was a critical 
part of the abolitionists’ arsenal.  In response to Parliament’s 1791 
rejection of an abolition bill, several hundred thousand Britons began 
boycotting sugar grown in the West Indies using slave labor.229  The 
action not only hurt the slave traders economically, but also raised 
public awareness of the issue and helped cement in the minds of Brits 
the connection between slave labor and their daily lives.230  Therefore, 
just as in the case of legal reform, consumer action is both a factor in 
norm development and a consequence of it. 
In the animal welfare area, consumer action has come before 
significant legislative response, at least in the United States.231  Because 
the rhetoric of consumer choice competes most easily with the 
producer’s rhetoric of economic freedom, it may be most realistic to 
begin with legislative action that facilitates consumer choice, such as 
expanding labeling laws to include information regarding production 
methods.232  Unfortunately, consumer information laws in the U.S. may 
run into several roadblocks, including claims that forcing companies to 
include information on their labels violates their First Amendment 
rights.233  Action at the state level may also be challenged as violating 
federalism principles, under which national labeling laws preempt any 
attempts by individual states to require more or different 
information.234  Even voluntary information provided by humane 
                                                 
 228  See, e.g., Bachman, supra note 3; Wasserman, supra note 219. 
 229  Hochschild, supra note 9, at 192-96. 
 230  Id. at 194. 
 231  See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 140. 
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farmers, such as “cage-free” eggs or “free range” beef, is useful in 
facilitating consumer choice.  However, without standards and 
oversight, consumers may question the veracity or value of such 
information. 
Consumer action must be part of the equation in modern reform 
efforts.  It can be faster than legislation and more powerful in giving 
producers an incentive to change methods.  However, studies show 
that consumers are typically more willing to express a preference for 
humanely raised products than actually to pay more for them at the 
market.235  Other studies suggest, similarly, that the public may be 
more willing to enact legislative restrictions on agriculture than to vote 
for such products with their dollars.236  Consumers may feel that a 
uniform restriction, raising the price for everyone, is fairer and may 
result in lowering the price of humane products through greater 
competition.  In any event, consumer action alone is unlikely to 
constitute the sole, or even the greatest, response to the animal welfare 
issue. 
3. Impact litigation 
 Litigation may be used not only as a way of changing the law, 
but as a method of building support in the community for a particular 
cause.  The visibility of a lawsuit can provide “a way of creating a 
collective identity,”237 or create a rallying point for generating financial 
and organizational resources.  Of course, the lawsuit may create new 
law, serving as precedent for important new directions in common law 
or statutory interpretation.  But even if the lawsuit is ultimately 
                                                                                                                                
requirements); National Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1994) (state law 
regulating "fresh" label on poultry preempted by federal Poultry Inspection Act).  But 
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not preempted by Nutrition Labeling and Education Act). 
 235  See generally DePelsmacker et al., supra note 209.  The authors note that 
organic products, for example, typically amount to 1% or less of market share.  See also 
Simon M. Shane, Conventional eggs preferred 40-1 over cage-free, EGG INDUSTRY (July 
2010), available at  www.wattagnet.com/Egg_Industry/16367.html (observing that 
even though a third of Americans say they support cage-free production methods, 
cage-free eggs account for only 2 to 3% of market share). 
 236  DeBow & Lee, supra note 31, at 998 (arguing that people are more likely to 
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unsuccessful, and sometimes because it is unsuccessful, it may raise 
public awareness regarding the issue and serve as a "triggering event" 
for legislative action.   
 Litigation does not seem to have played a significant role in the 
historical development of British child labor regulation, but in the 
United States, a legal defeat ultimately may have furthered the reform 
cause.  As noted above, in 1918 a closely divided Supreme Court struck 
down the Keating-Owen Act, which had attempted to regulate 
interstate commerce in goods produced with child labor.238  Federal 
action was preferable to state legislation, reformers believed, because 
some states were reluctant to alienate industry with intrusive 
regulation.239  Although the Dagenhart ruling was a setback, the case 
served to galvanize reformers and to bring the issue to public 
attention.240  More recently, well-publicized lawsuits have alleged the 
illegal use of child labor by Bridgestone Firestone at plantations in 
Liberia241 and by chocolate importers on cocoa farms in the Ivory 
Coast.242 
 In the abolitionist movement, one landmark case played a key 
role.  In the Somerset case, in the early 1770s, a slave brought to 
England escaped and was recaptured by his master.  In a suit on a writ 
of habeas corpus, Lord Mansfield declared that English law did not 
allow a runaway slave to be seized on English soil.243  The case thus 
served to increase public consciousness of the evils of slavery and was a 
triggering event for further reform.  As one commentator put it: “The 
Somerset case together highlighted the anomalies and contradictions of 
slavery, brought the abstract and distanced evils of slavery to the 
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people’s doorstep, gave slavery its ugly face, and enlarged the public 
consciousness about the injustice and undesirability of slavery.”244 
 Lawsuits on behalf of animals have been a significant resource in 
solidifying the animal rights/welfare movement, in addition to 
advancing legal protections.245  For example, in the 1990s the Animal 
Legal Defense Fund challenged the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
regulations setting minimum requirements for the psychological well-
being of primates.246  Although the litigation was ultimately 
unsuccessful in overturning the challenged regulations,247 the lawsuit 
raised awareness concerning the confinement conditions of primates.248  
Similarly, a lawsuit filed in 2000 by animal welfare groups (including 
the ASPCA) alleging abuse of elephants by the Ringling Brothers and 
Barnum & Bailey's circus operation eventually was dismissed.249  The 
lawsuit did, however, result in significant publicity regarding these 
practices, which may affect consumer behavior and government 
oversight.250 
D.   Post-reform Reaction 
  
Social scientists have long recognized that the enactment of 
major legislation is really only the first step toward social reform.  
Statutory reform may result from a temporary coalition of interest 
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groups, supported by intensive media focus and triggering events.  
Once the built-up pressure for reform has been released by legislative 
action, those coalitions then may disintegrate, especially in areas like 
environmental reform where the general public has only a diffuse 
interest and there are significant free-rider concerns.  On the other 
hand, the concentrated economic interests opposing reform have 
staying power and can undermine subsequent efforts to implement and 
enforce the law.251  As public choice theorists explain: 
 
In contrast to members of the general public, who 
quickly forget the legislation once it is enacted, the 
affected special interests will attempt unrelentingly to 
influence the day-to-day details of enforcing the 
legislation.  Legislative attempts to protect the 
environment, protect the consumer, and regulate 
business pricing and practices exemplify special 
interest groups' subversion of public interest legislation 
initially motivated by ideological conviction.252 
 
 The history of child labor reform in Britain illustrates the staying 
power required to overcome entrenched and organized economic 
interests.  Addressing the child labor problem required almost a 
century of effort, including numerous legislative enactments that were 
touted as progress, but which failed to accomplish the task.  Early 
Factory Acts were limited to the most egregious abuses, but even those 
failed due to lack of enforcement and implementation.253  For example, 
the budget for factory and mine labor inspection remained a paltry 
amount even twenty years after the 1833 Factory Act imposed its 
requirements.  Age limitations could not be enforced without a reliable 
system of age verification.  Employers quickly became adept at finding 
ways to evade the legislative edicts.254  A solid organizational structure 
is necessary to sustain reform efforts once legislation has placated the 
initial ardor for change. 
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 Similarly, the abolition of slavery met with "blowback" in the 
form of Jim Crow laws that circumvented and undermined the promise 
of equality contained in the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments.255 The 
Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods teach us that reform 
that flies in the face of entrenched power requires a sustained effort to 
change, and legal reform without the support of a concomitant change 
in social norms will be ineffective.256   
 In the animal welfare context, a similar pattern of reform and 
compromise has already begun.  For example, Gary Francione claims 
that many of the "victories" claimed by animal welfare advocates in 
recent years have been at best ineffective and at worst 
counterproductive.257  For example, one supposed reform increased the 
space allotted to a hen in a battery cage from a square with 7.8 inches 
per side to 8.5 inches per side, hardly much improvement but still 
touted as such.258  Francione notes that activists such as Peter Singer, 
the author of Animal Liberation, and groups such as PETA profess to 
be encouraged and pleased with reforms that, in his view, are merely 
window-dressing.259  His complaint in fact describes a classic process of 
co-option260 in which reformers embrace incremental improvements 
and end up reinforcing the very institutions they set out to resist.  
Critiques of labor reform, for example, have concluded that the 
National Labor Relations Act, while touted as “a great victory for labor 
interests,”261 actually blunted the activism and potential gains of 
workers: 
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The most strident critics claimed that codified collective 
bargaining had become “an institutional structure not 
for expressing workers' needs and aspirations but for 
controlling and disciplining the labor force and 
rationalizing the labor market.”  Those critics 
concluded that, paradoxically, the apparent legal 
success of the New Deal social reform struggles 
enabled the deradicalization and pacification of labor 
movement activism.262 
 
This phase is reminiscent of early child labor legislation, which 
appeased the most urgent calls for reform but in reality did very little to 
address the problem.  Although some argue that this phenomenon 
illustrates the limitations of the legal system as a vehicle for social 
reform, the history of child labor shows that legal regulation coupled 
with norm development did in fact result in positive change. 
 Even when domestic reform is finally accomplished, the 
increased cost of production inevitably results in greater foreign 
competitive pressure.  Domestic legislation may merely have the effect 
of exporting the problem to other countries.  Today, more than a 
century after domestic child labor reform virtually eliminated the abuse 
in Britain, international statistics show that millions of young children 
continue to work at hard labor.263  The reform effort continues, 
therefore, through a combination of attempts to strengthen 
international agreements, trade sanctions, political pressure, and 
consumer action (e.g., boycotts of products made with child labor).   In 
the U.S., for example, Senator Tom Harkin proposed (unsuccessfully) 
the Child Labor Deterrence Act to ban the importation of goods 
produced with child labor.264   As in the area of endangered species 
protection or rainforest destruction, the economic incentives to use 
child labor mean that the battle will never be over and constant effort 
will be required to keep the problem in check.   
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 There is no reason to suppose that the animal welfare reform 
effort will be different.  Already scholars have noted that 
"[i]nternational trade represents a special problem for animal-welfare 
legislation."265  Any attempt simply to ban imports not meeting similar 
animal welfare standards will run into World Trade Organization 
arguments regarding unlawful barriers to free trade.266  
 
Conclusion 
 The history of child labor reform illustrates that it is possible to 
achieve protection for powerless groups, even when such protection is 
detrimental to society's economic self-interest.   Because the impetus for 
reform is moral, the development of a new ethic is crucial.  This will not 
happen overnight, but the combined efforts of many moral 
entrepreneurs, who disseminate the stories that resonate in the societal 
conscience, can eventually make a difference.  In addition, the progress 
of reform depends on a number of other elements, including the 
development of an array of symbolic resources, such as the language 
and intellectual argument to counter the free-market ideology of 
industrialized agriculture, and structural resources, including the 
collaborative efforts of animal welfare organizations.  This model of 
reform applies beyond the context of child labor and animal welfare, of 
course - it should be instructive for any effort to obtain protection for 
powerless groups. 
 One important question is whether moral concerns alone can 
bring about meaningful reform, when powerful economic forces clearly 
favor the status quo.  Even in cases like child labor and slavery, subjects 
more central to the average citizen's moral compass than animal 
welfare, reformers relied not only on moral suasion, but also developed 
economic arguments to counteract the laissez faire arguments of factory 
owners and slaveholders.  However, the history also shows that reform 
can be motivated largely by altruistic, moral concerns.  Moreover, once 
a new ethic is firmly established - toward child labor or slavery, e.g. - it 
can be at least as powerful as legal reform in changing behavior. 
                                                 
 265  Matheny & Leahy, supra note 6, at 348. 
 266   Id. at 349-55 (discussing arguments under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for import restrictions based on animal welfare). 
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Without this ethical shift, in fact, mere legislative reform will probably 
be ineffective. 
The complex forces necessary to effect change seem to be 
swirling around us, and the success of reform efforts depends on 
whether they can be marshaled correctly.  William Shakespeare, 
perhaps as adept a political scientist as he was a poet, noted long ago: 
“There is a tide in the affairs of men, / Which taken at the flood, leads 
on to fortune.”267  We seem to be on the brink of such a rising tide in the 
area of animal welfare reform.  Even a decade ago, the stream was 
practically bone-dry.  But each of the elements of reform discussed 
above have contributed a trickle to what has now become a steady flow 
driving the boats for reform.   Whether reform advocates can capitalize 
on this rising tide before it wanes remains to be seen. The history of 
child labor reform provides a template that should help a new 
generation of reformers who seek to improve the welfare of animals 
impacted by the industrial agricultural revolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 267  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act 4, Scene 3, lines 218-19. 
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Model: Path to Reform for the Powerless 
 
 
